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“Lonesome Road”*: Driving Without the Fourth 
Amendment 
Lewis R. Katz** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While America promotes the need for governments to act in accord 
with the rule of law throughout the world, we have abandoned the rule of 
law in our own country. Our streets and highways have become a police 
state where officers have virtually unchecked discretion about which cars 
to stop for the myriad of traffic offenses contained in state statutes and 
municipal ordinances, and that discretion is often aimed at minority mo-
torists. Courts look the other way and will not inquire into the officer’s 
decision to stop a particular motorist if the reviewing court finds that the 
officer had sufficient facts to believe that the motorist committed a traffic 
offense.1 Where there is an objectively reasonable justification for the 
stop, pretextual traffic stops may not be challenged even when the under-
lying reason for the stop is race.2 
Once an officer stops a motorist for a traffic offense, the officer has 
discretion to transform that traffic stop into an investigation of other se-
rious crimes without the check of reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
                                                        
* BOB DYLAN, Ain’t Talkin’, on MODERN TIMES (Columbia Records 2006) (“Ain’t no altars on this 
long and lonesome road”); BOB DYLAN, Don’t Think Twice, It’s All Right, on THE FREEWHEELIN’ 
BOB DYLAN (Columbia Records 1963) (“I’m walkin’ down that long, lonesome road, babe”); BOB 
DYLAN, Tough Mama, on PLANET WAVES (Asylum Records 1974) (“With the badge of the lone-
some road sewed in your sleeve”). 
** Lewis R. Katz is the John C. Hutchins Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University Law 
School. He is grateful for the research support provided by the Law School and for the comments 
and suggestions of several colleagues, Michael Benza, George Dent, Sharona Hoffman, and Jacqui 
Lipton. He is especially grateful for the research and editorial assistance provided by his research 
assistants, Emily Myers, Noah Fowle, and Thomas Kelly. He thanks Deborah Dennison, the Head of 
Bibliographic Access at the CWRU Law Library, for her magic in finding even the most obscure and 
hidden sources. 
 1. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 2. See Tracey Maclin, United States v. Whren: The Fourth Amendment Problem with 
Pretextual Stops, in WE DISSENT 90, 94 (Michael Avery ed., 2009) (“Tellingly, the decision in 
Whren did not question the defendants’ claim that racial profiling had occurred in their case or was 
occurring nationwide.”). 
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to limit the inquiry.3 The only limitation on the investigation of other 
crimes is that the duration of that stop is subject to the Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness standard.4 Courts disagree on what length of time is 
reasonable, but even a fifteen-minute traffic stop is long enough for an 
officer to run a drug dog around the car, ask the motorist about nontraffic 
offenses, and request permission to search the car.5 Many police routine-
ly ask people stopped for nonarrestable traffic violations for permission 
to search the car, obviously to look for evidence unrelated to the traffic 
offense. Whether the motorist voluntarily consents to the search will be 
litigated only if that search leads to the discovery of evidence; courts de-
termine the voluntariness of the consent without regard to the critical 
issue of whether the motorist knew that he or she had a right to refuse. 
In some states, police also have discretion to arrest rather than issue 
a traffic citation even for a minor traffic offense, further enhancing the 
officer’s status as the unchecked king of the highway. The Supreme 
Court has held that an arrest for the most trivial offense does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment if state law allows it.6 In states where officers 
have the discretion to write a ticket or to arrest, officers may base that 
decision upon whether they want to search the motorist and possibly 
even the vehicle.7 The law has developed so that the officer need not ar-
ticulate a legal basis for the search.8 When the officer’s testimony of the 
incident indicates an absence of lawful justification for the search, the 
reviewing and appellate courts will uphold the search if there are other 
legal grounds for the search.9 The message those courts are sending to 
the police is search the car now, and a reviewing court will find a lawful 
justification for the search later. 
The protections of the Fourth Amendment on the streets and high-
ways of America have been drastically curtailed. This Article traces the 
debasement of Fourth Amendment protections on the road and how the 
Fourth Amendment’s core value of preventing arbitrary police behavior 
                                                        
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Part II.C. 
 5. Not all courts concur that a fifteen-minute stop is automatically reasonable. See United 
States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 511 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he government’s argument fails to 
recognize that investigative stops must be limited both in scope and duration. Creating a rule that 
allows a police officer fifteen minutes to do as he pleases reduces the duration component to a 
bright-line rule and eliminates the scope inquiry altogether. In its reasonableness jurisprudence the 
Supreme Court has ‘consistently eschewed bright-line rules,’ and the scope of a police officer’s 
actions remains relevant in Fourth Amendment traffic stop inquiry.” (emphasis in original) (citations 
omitted)). 
 6. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 7. See infra Part II.D–E. 
 8. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
 9. Id. 
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has been marginalized.10 Over the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court 
has handed down four decisions solidifying police discretion and largely 
eliminating Fourth Amendment oversight of the decision to stop a partic-
ular car and the scope of investigation that follows the stop.11 The re-
maining Fourth Amendment issues provide scant protection for motor-
ists. This Article first discusses Whren v. United States,12 which insulates 
pretextual traffic stops from Fourth Amendment challenges. 
This Article contends that the existence of a traffic offense should 
not be the end of the inquiry but the first step, and that defendants should 
be able to challenge the reasonableness even when there is proof of a 
traffic offense.13 Similarly, the Article contends that the existence of state 
law authorizing arrests for minor, often trivial traffic offenses should be 
assessed next in determining the reasonableness of an officer’s decision 
to make a custodial arrest for a minor traffic offense.14 The Article out-
lines the many different categories of encounters between police and mo-
torists, and then sets forth how police are empowered to transform the 
traffic stop into an investigation of more serious crimes.15 Finally, the 
Article proposes that a police officer should be required to offer a rea-
sonable explanation for subjecting a defendant stopped for a minor traffic 
offense to an expanded investigation.16 Motorists subject to the broader 
inquiry tend to be young, black or Hispanic men who are profiled as po-
                                                        
 10. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (“The essential purpose of the 
proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise 
of discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents . . . .” (citations omitted)); 
City of Ontario v. Quon 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2627 (2010) (“The [Fourth] Amendment guarantees the 
privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the 
Government.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlock-
ers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth 
Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1492 (“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment 
requires that reasonableness review be ultra-deferential. Indeed, given the reasons why the Fourth 
Amendment was included in the Bill of Rights—the desire to constrain arbitrary and exploratory 
governmental searches and seizures—a non-deferential standard of review is more appropriate than 
deferential, pro-government review.”). 
 11. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) (allowing police discretion to remove driver 
or passenger from a car to pat them down for weapons); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 
(2001) (allowing police discretion to arrest a motorist for minor traffic violations); Ohio v. Robi-
nette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (allowing police to pull a motorist out of a vehicle to ask questions unre-
lated to the traffic stop); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that officer’s motiva-
tion is not determinative in establishing the reasonableness of a lawful traffic stop under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 12. Whren, 517 U.S. 806. 
 13. See infra Part II.D. 
 14. Id. 
 15. And this Article explores whether the opportunity to investigate for other crimes may have 
motivated the officer’s initial decision to single out a specific motorist from others committing the 
same traffic offense. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part II.D. 
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tential drug carriers.17 The Supreme Court has turned its back on this 
population and has eliminated meaningful Fourth Amendment review of 
what happens on the streets and highways after it is established that a 
traffic offense has occurred. This Article suggests that the Supreme 
Court reconsider its uninterrupted line of cases over the past fifteen years 
that have stripped the Fourth Amendment of its meaningfulness on the 
roads and highways of America. The Article proposes the following: (1) 
police should be limited in the stops that they can make, and stops should 
be required to serve a highway safety purpose; (2) the commission of a 
minor traffic offense should not be sufficient justification for a custodial 
arrest without a showing of additional need; (3) police should not be al-
lowed to escalate every traffic stop into an inquiry about more serious 
offenses without reasonable suspicion; and (4) police should demonstrate 
a reason for requesting to search a minor traffic offender’s vehicle. 
Without such reform, American motorists will continue to be subject to 
the whims of police officers every time they step foot into their cars. 
II. THE COLLAPSE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS IN  
TRAFFIC STOPS 
A. Whren v. United States 
Many factors influence a police officer’s decision not only to single 
out and stop a vehicle for a traffic infraction, but whether to warn, cite, 
or arrest the motorist in jurisdictions where arrest for a traffic offense is 
an available option.18 The law finds some factors permissible and beyond 
reproach, such as when the traffic violation creates a risk to the motorist 
or to other cars on the road.19 However, some factors are not beyond re-
proach; some motorists are targeted because the officer wants to investi-
gate more serious crimes and hopes to obtain the motorist’s “consent” to 
                                                        
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 110 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 18. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) (“[T]hat the multitude of applicable 
traffic and equipment regulations is so large and so difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyone 
is guilty of violation, permitting the police to single out almost whomever they wish for a stop.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic 
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 559 
(1997) (“[W]ith the traffic code in hand, any officer can stop any driver any time. The most the 
officer will have to do is ‘tail a driver for a while,’ and probable cause will materialize like magic.”). 
 19. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979) (“We agree that the States have a vital inter-
est in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that these 
vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection re-
quirements are being observed.”); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (“In Delaware v. 
Prouse we recognized the ‘vital interest’ in highway safety and the various programs that contribute 
to that interest.”). 
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search the vehicle.20 Some officers single out motorists from the larger 
driving population based on race or ethnicity, which is an unconstitution-
al practice.21 However, the Supreme Court has foreclosed the pretext 
challenge under the Fourth Amendment if a legal basis existed for the 
traffic stop, regardless of the officer’s motivation.22 Moreover, the Equal 
Protection Clause, as demonstrated below, is unlikely to gain footing as a 
viable alternative to litigate and control pretextual stops. 
In Whren v. United States,23 plainclothes officers in two unmarked 
police cars patrolling in a “high drug area” observed young black men in 
a truck with temporary license plates.24 The men were stopped at a stop 
sign for more than twenty seconds, and the driver was looking down into 
his passenger’s lap. The driver turned right without signaling and sped 
off at an unreasonable speed. One of the unmarked police cars went after 
the truck and stopped alongside the truck, which by then was stopped at a 
red light behind other traffic. The officer testified that he intended to is-
sue a warning to the driver for his failure to signal a turn and for speed-
ing. When the officer approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and or-
                                                        
 20. Harris, supra note 18, at 575 (“[O]fficers ask the people they stop to consent to a search. 
While those asked need not consent, many do. . . . [T]he predominant reason drivers consent lies 
with the police officers. Their goal, plain and simple, is to get people to agree to a search.”). 
 21. Farm Labor Organizing Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 533–34 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (“[I]f the plaintiffs can show that they were subjected to unequal treatment based upon 
their race or ethnicity during the course of an otherwise lawful traffic stop, that would be sufficient 
to demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. . . . An invidious discriminatory purpose 
may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the 
[practice] bears more heavily on one race than another.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see 
id. at 553 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“I believe there is the same need for the Whren analysis in equal 
protection claims, a holding that an officer may arrest with probable cause and that the court will not 
examine whether the officer also had discriminatory purpose.”). 
 22. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discrimi-
natory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective 
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”); Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2078 (2011) (“A warrant based on individualized suspicion grants more pro-
tection than existed in most of this Court’s cases eschewing inquiries into intent.”). But see State v. 
Heath, 929 A.2d 390, 406 (Del. 2006) (“Therefore, for an officer to conduct an investigation beyond 
that required in order to complete the purpose of the traffic stop, the occupants must consent or the 
officer must have independent facts sufficient to justify this additional intrusion. . . . While Whren is 
utilized to declare that a purely pretextual stop is not offensive to the Fourth Amendment, the stand-
ard announced by the Caldwell Court effectively works to place a restriction on ‘police officers’ 
authority to employ marginally applicable traffic laws as a device to circumvent constitutional 
search and seizure requirements.” (quoting Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1048 (Del. 2001))); 
State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d 143, 153 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (“We believe that our constitutional re-
quirement that searches and seizures be reasonable based on the particular facts of each case should 
preclude our adoption of the mechanical federal rule that a technical violation of the traffic code 
automatically legitimizes a stop. Further, consistent with our previous departures from federal prece-
dent, we do not believe that the federal bright-line rule is justified.”). 
 23. Whren, 517 U.S. 806. 
 24. Id. at 808 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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dered the driver to put the car in park, the officer saw two large plastic 
bags that appeared to contain crack cocaine in the driver’s hands. By ini-
tiating the traffic stop, the officers violated District of Columbia police 
regulations that allow plainclothes officers in unmarked police cars to 
enforce traffic laws “only in the case of a violation that is so grave as to 
pose an immediate threat to the safety of others.”25 At the pretrial sup-
pression hearing, the arresting officer denied that he stopped the car be-
cause of racial profiling.26 
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, said, “We of course 
agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforce-
ment of the law based on considerations such as race,”27 but then elimi-
nated Fourth Amendment pretext challenges based upon race in a crimi-
nal case: “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause 
Fourth Amendment analysis.”28 The officer’s state of mind “does not 
invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objec-
tively, justify that action.”29 When the prosecution can demonstrate prob-
able cause or reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop or arrest, an 
officer’s ulterior motive is irrelevant. Of course, in most cases it will be 
impossible to prove an officer’s ulterior motive—as in Whren where the 
officer denied engaging in racial profiling. However, the Court’s test also 
forecloses such challenges even when the officer admits on the record 
that race or a desire to investigate other crimes motivated the stop and 
that there was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify inves-
tigating the other offenses.30 The Court failed to address cases of admit-
ted racial profiling, but its general rule applies to those cases as well. 
The Supreme Court did not explain how a court could ignore an of-
ficer’s admission to a pretextual motivation for the stop or why our so-
ciety should place its imprimatur of approval on such stops, especially in 
light of our country’s troubled history of race relations and the ongoing 
story of police interference with black motorists.31 The Court would sure-
                                                        
 25. Id. at 815 (quoting WASHINGTON, D.C., GENERAL ORDER 303.1, pt. 1, OBJECTIVES & 
POLICIES (A)(2)(4) (Apr. 30, 1992)). 
 26. United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[Officer Soto] testified that 
the decision to stop the Pathfinder was not based upon the ‘racial profile’ of the appellants, but rather 
on the actions of the driver.”). 
 27. Whren, 571 U.S. at 813. 
 28. Id. (“But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of 
laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 
532 U.S. 769, 769 (2001) (“[A]ny improper subjective motivation of police officer for stopping 
defendant’s vehicle did not render arrest violative of Fourth Amendment . . . .”). 
 29. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)). 
 30. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 31. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
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ly respond that they do not approve of stops based on racial profiling, but 
their holding in Whren rebuts that denial.32 
The Supreme Court also rejected an alternative pretext challenge 
that avoids the subjective analysis of the police officer’s actual motiva-
tion by substituting a “reasonable officer” standard, focusing on whether 
a reasonable officer would have made the stop or arrest under the same 
circumstances.33 In advancing this argument, the petitioners in Whren 
focused on the local police regulations that restricted stops by plain-
clothes officers absent an “immediate threat to the safety of others.”34 
Justice Scalia dismissed the reasonable officer test as a subterfuge for 
challenging pretextual stops based on subjective intent, “the more sensi-
ble option,” but one that he had already foreclosed.35 The principal basis 
of the rule “is simply that the Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘rea-
                                                        
 32. The current Supreme Court has even applied the “objective reasonableness” standard to 
unrelated areas where the actual belief of the officer is relevant to determining whether that officer’s 
conduct was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, in each case to expand police power under 
the emergency or exigency theory where the officers’ conduct belied a belief in the actual existence 
of an emergency or exigent circumstances. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006) 
(rejecting the Utah Supreme Court finding that the officers did not act to assist the injured person but 
acted exclusively in their law enforcement capacity by arresting the adults and that “the officers had 
an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the 
violence in the kitchen was just beginning”), construed in United States. v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 
(10th Cir. 2006) (reading Brigham as eliminating inquiry into whether police officers were motivat-
ed to enter with investigatory intent); Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (2011) (holding that 
in limiting the scope of the police-created exigency rule upon the exigent circumstances exception to 
the warrant requirement, “[l]egal tests based on reasonableness are generally objective, and this 
Court has long taken the view that ‘evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application 
of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind 
of the officer’” (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990))); Michigan v. Fisher, 130 
S. Ct. 546, 549 (2009) (using an objective reasonableness test “even if the failure to summon medi-
cal personnel conclusively established that [the officer] did not subjectively believe, when he entered 
the house, that Fisher or someone else was seriously injured”). 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Furthermore, we 
reject the government’s contention that the stop nevertheless was valid because Trooper Vogel could 
have stopped the car to investigate the possibility of drunk driving. We conclude that in determining 
whether an investigative stop is invalid as pretextual, the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable 
officer would have made the seizure in the absence of illegitimate motivation.”); United States v. 
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled by United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 
F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (“For these reasons, we believe the Eleventh Circuit has established the 
better test for determining whether an investigatory stop is unconstitutional: a court should ask ‘not 
whether the officer could validly have made the stop, but whether under the same circumstances a 
reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose.’”) (construing 
Smith, 799 F.2d 704). 
 34. Whren, 517 U.S. at 815 (emphasis in original). 
 35. Id. at 814 (“Why one would frame a test designed to combat pretext in such fashion that the 
court cannot take into account actual and admitted pretext is a curiosity that can only be explained 
by the fact that our cases have foreclosed the more sensible option.”). 
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sonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, 
whatever the subjective intent.”36 
The Court also dismissed the relevancy of local regulation as a test 
for how a reasonable officer would have responded, holding that “[w]e 
cannot accept that the search and seizure protections of the Fourth 
Amendment are so variable, and can be made to turn upon such triviali-
ties.”37 Of course, the Court used the same District of Columbia general 
police regulation to buttress the bright-line rule allowing a full-body 
search of an arrested motorist.38 The Court has also used a reasonable 
officer test to support expanded police power in other contexts where the 
officer’s actual belief did not support the same expansion of police au-
thority.39 
The Court’s holding in Whren institutionalizes pretextual stops and 
arrests. It serves as a green light for police officers to stop whomever 
they please, regardless of the officer’s reason, provided that the officer 
can show facts and circumstances rising to the level of a traffic violation. 
No matter how selective the stop, Whren forecloses the issue under the 
Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the Court failed to address several ques-
tions, including (1) why stopping a particular motorist for a traffic of-
fense committed by other motorists at the same time is reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment, and (2) why courts should ignore the racial as-
pects of these cases. Police enforcement practices that focus on minority 
drivers serve only to increase tensions between minority communities 
and the police and deserve an airing under the Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness standard. The Court’s silence on this critical concern re-
moves the Fourth Amendment from a possible solution to vexing racial 
issues and acts as a cowardly endorsement of such policies. Following 
Whren, the Supreme Court expressed general discomfort with “the ‘vast 
amount of discretion’ granted to the police in its enforcement,” but the 
Court expressed its discomfort in a case challenging an anti-gang ordi-
                                                        
 36. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 37. Id. at 815 (citations omitted). 
 38. See infra notes 203–04 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Robinson, 414 
U.S. 218, 223 n.2 (1973) (“[O]fficers are instructed to examine the ‘contents of all of the pockets’ of 
the arrestee in the course of the field search. . . . [T]hese standard operating procedures were initiated 
by the police department primarily, for the officer’s own safety and, secondly, for the safety of the 
individual he has placed under arrest and, thirdly, to search for evidence of the crime.” (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted)). 
 39. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (finding public safety exception to the 
requirement that police issue Miranda warnings to an arrestee before asking questions; officer’s 
explanation that he asked the question because he wanted to find the gun to use as evidence was not 
decisive because the “reasonable officer” would have been concerned that the unfound gun posed a 
threat to public safety). 
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nance on First Amendment grounds.40 The Supreme Court has not revis-
ited the issues raised in Whren other than to reaffirm its commitment to 
the Whren doctrine. 
B. Use of Race in Traffic Stops, Before and After Whren 
The Court’s holding in Whren merely solidified a trend in United 
States jurisprudence toward ignoring police officers’ racial biases, admit-
ted or otherwise. In fact, courts have upheld traffic stops even when the 
police officer openly admits to using race as the motivating factor behind 
making the stop. In United States v. Harvey,41 a pre-Whren case, the de-
fendants were driving in a 1978 Chevrolet automobile with a missing 
headlight and bumper, three miles over the speed limit.42 The police of-
ficer later admitted to making the stop based on race.43 The defendant 
clearly committed a traffic violation, albeit slight at just three miles over 
the speed limit, but as the dissent said, 
The problem . . . is the officer said he stopped the vehicle because 
the occupants were African-Americans. Officer Collardey testified 
if the occupants had not been African-Americans, he would not 
have stopped the car. Officer Collardey’s improper motivation for 
the stop inserted an unconstitutional illegality into the stop. . . . Yet, 
the majority acquiesces to an officer’s substitution of race for prob-
able cause and essentially licenses the state to discriminate.44 
A more recent term for using race in making traffic stops is “de-
policing,” which the New Jersey Superior Court defined as “officers, on 
their own, decid[ing] to stop taking pro-active steps to engage citizens.”45 
Officers who take this approach believe “that if they don’t initiate con-
tact with members of the public, they can’t be accused of using racial 
biases.”46 
                                                        
 40. United States v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), aff’g 687 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1997) (“The gang 
loitering ordinance fails to meet these standards. The ordinance provides such ambiguous definitions 
of its elements that it does not discourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. The definition of 
loitering as ‘to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose’ provides absolute discretion to 
police officers to decide what activities constitute loitering. Moreover, police are given complete 
discretion to determine whether any members of a group are gang members. These guidelines do not 
conform with accepted standards for defining a criminal offense.”). 
 41. United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 42. Id. at 110. 
 43. Id. at 113 (Keith, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. at 113–14. 
 45. Gacina v. State, No. L-1427-05, 2011 WL 9275, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 16, 
2010). 
 46. Id. 
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In United States v. Hare,47 a U.S. district court discussed a state 
trooper’s admitted use of de-policing in a defendant’s selective enforce-
ment claim. Trooper Pelster pulled the defendant over on the highway 
one night for improperly changing lanes and cutting off both Pelster and 
another driver. The defendant offered Pelster’s testimony that he “would 
sometimes intentionally refrain from stopping minority motorists who 
had committed traffic violations in an attempt to avoid being perceived 
as a racist.”48 Pelster called this practice de-policing, and he explained 
that it never meant choosing to stop a driver, only choosing not to stop a 
driver, based on race.49 The court held, 
While this testimony may prove that Pelster was unsophisticated, 
and quite frightened about being called a racist, it certainly does not 
have any tendency to prove that he stopped, searched, or arrested 
the defendants, or anyone else, because of their race or ethnicity. If 
it proves anything, it proves the opposite of the inference suggested 
by the defendants. This is particularly true where, as here, the evi-
dence showed that the officer acted professionally when dealing 
with members of the minority public.50 
The court disparaged Pelster’s actions, holding that “[s]topping some 
‘threshold’ number of white motorists does not permit occasional mis-
treatment of non-white motorists. To hold otherwise would make a 
mockery of the protections of the Equal Protection Clause.”51 The court 
even acknowledged that Pelster’s de-policing practice amounted to selec-
tive enforcement based on race, but stopped short of finding for the de-
fendant, since Pelster stopped the defendant at night and Pelster testified 
that he could not de-police in the dark unless the area was well-lit.52 The 
court addressed Trooper Pelster’s behavior with a mere slap on the wrist, 
saying that he should be ordered to cease and desist from his use of se-
lective enforcement based on race.53 In any event, decisions not to stop 
based on race, just as decisions to stop based on race, are arbitrary and 
lawless. 
                                                        
 47. United States v. Hare, 308 F. Supp. 2d 955, 966 (D. Neb. 2004). 
 48. Id. at 966. 
 49. Id. at 975–76. 
 50. Id. at 966. 
 51. Id. at 995. 
 52. Id. at 994 (“As such, unless he was patrolling in areas particularly well lighted during 
nighttime hours, any efforts he made to stop more white motorists would likely occur in the daytime 
when he could readily see the driver’s race or skin color.”). 
 53. Id. 
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C. Alternative Challenges to Pretext Stops: Equal Protection 
The absence of Fourth Amendment challenges to a traffic stop sup-
ported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause should not end the in-
quiry into how police select those to stop and those not to stop. The se-
lection process deserves scrutiny, given that most of us give police cause 
to stop us every time we operate a vehicle,54 and we understand from the 
outset that it is impossible for police to stop every driver who commits 
an infraction.55 Real safety concerns necessitate certain traffic laws, and 
stops made in furtherance thereof are beyond question. There is adequate 
control upon an officer’s discretion when the statute or ordinance in-
cludes an element requiring that the traffic offense or equipment viola-
tion create a dangerous driving condition.56 However, most traffic laws 
do not include such a limitation on the officer’s discretion, in which case, 
observation of a violation is sufficient to justify the traffic stop.57 
                                                        
 54. See Harris, supra note 18, at 558 (“Police officers in some jurisdictions have a rule of 
thumb: the average driver cannot go three blocks without violating some traffic regulation.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Approximate Number of Traffic Citations, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY 
ADMIN., http://portal.nhtsa-tsis.net/triprs/f?p=103:12:4359233143959016 (click “Browse TRI”; then 
browse by state; then click on “Traffic Citation Data System”; then refer to question #2, approximate 
number of traffic citations) (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (Illinois: 2,387,413 (May 17, 2012); New 
York: 4,000,000 (Apr. 16, 2012); Colorado: 185,000 (Mar. 19, 2010); Arizona: 953,000 (June 2, 
2007)). 
 56. Compare People v. McQuown, 943 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (upholding the stop 
and search of a vehicle because “the officer indicated defendant had been stopped for having an 
obstructed windshield based on air fresheners hanging on the rearview mirror”), with People v. Ari-
as, 159 P.3d 134, 138 (Colo. 2007) (holding that mere observation of an air freshener cannot be the 
basis for a traffic stop); Swagerty v. State, 982 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (finding a statute 
authorized stop for cracked windshield only if officer reasonably believed that crack rendered vehi-
cle in such unsafe condition as to endanger person or property); State v. Kendall, No. 2009-CA-
0010, 2010 WL 308038, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2010) (“The Court concluded that the simple 
appearance of a crack in a windshield does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of a violation of 
R.C. 4513.02(A). Rather, this Court has recognized that the size and placement of the crack must be 
sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that R.C. 4513.02 was being violated.” (citation omitted)); 
State v. Elmore, 250 P.3d 439, 443 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (“As defendant posits, ‘a crack is not a tan-
gible or physical object separate from the window itself. It does not have its own substance beyond 
pure window glass.’ Here, the deputy stopped defendant because he saw a crack in defendant’s 
windshield. Accordingly, because the facts, as the deputy actually perceived them, did not satisfy the 
elements of ORS 815.220(2) [which requires ‘material’ on the windshield], he lacked objective 
probable cause to stop defendant.”); and Commonwealth v. Shabazz, 18 A.3d 1217 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2011) (finding police reasonably believed a driver was in violation of a statute that prohibited hang-
ing of material obstructions from vehicle’s inside rearview mirror and thus supported traffic stop; 
officer testified specifically about the size and nature of the air fresheners and fuzzy dice he ob-
served hanging from the rearview mirror and explained how these items might impair a driver’s 
view). 
 57. See United States v. Contreras Trevino, 448 F.3d 821, 824–25 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[The] 
district court also found that the appellant’s license plate frame covered the state motto, ‘The Lone 
Star State,’ as well as a picture of oil derricks and much of the ‘cowboy in the country’ design. The 
defendant does not contest these factual findings, nor do we believe that the district court clearly 
erred in making them. We affirm the district court’s finding that the defendant’s license plate violat-
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Oftentimes, traffic stops may be less about real safety issues and 
more about investigating other crimes and drug interdiction.58 The feder-
al government, through training and by providing financial incentives to 
local police departments,59 encourages local governments to engage in 
high-volume traffic stops to stop the flow of illegal narcotics. Although 
federal and state materials disclaim the use of profiles in “Operation 
Pipeline,”60 the facts indicate otherwise61: Young male African-
                                                                                                                            
ed section 502.409(a)(7) [which provides that the license plate must be readable] and that the offic-
ers had probable cause to stop the appellant’s vehicle.”); Haynes v. State, 937 N.E.2d 1248, 1253 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“As such, we find that Officer McCollum had reasonable suspicion to stop 
Haynes and therefore the stop was legal. The Officer personally observed that Haynes’s car was 
illegally parked in the handicap spot. The car had no handicap license plate and no visible permits 
inside.”); State v. Jones, No. 92820, 2009 WL 3490947, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2009) (“Of-
ficer Jones therefore had probable cause to approach Jones because he observed Jones violating an 
East Cleveland parking ordinance. The fact that it was a parking violation, and not a traffic violation, 
is a distinction without a difference.”). 
 58. See Maclin, supra note 2, at 101 (“We know, of course, that police officers will not use the 
discretion granted by [Whren] against every motorist . . . police will utilize this discretionary power 
selectively. As in this case, African American male motorists will bear the brunt of this arbitrary 
police power. . . . The Court has permitted police to conduct arbitrary traffic seizures in order to 
pursue drug investigations unsupported by objective evidence of criminality.” (construing Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996))). 
 59. See generally United States v. Sosa, 104 F. Supp. 2d 722, 727–29 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (not-
ing that “[w]hile, under Whren, ‘Operation Pipeline’ is not itself illegal, judges should be mindful of 
the potential affect [sic] a request to make a ‘pipeline’ stop may have on a police officer’s observa-
tions of an automobile” and upholding the “pipeline stop” even though the officers openly admitted 
that his true motive for making the stop was to search for contraband in defendant’s car, because the 
traffic stop was based on probable cause). But see Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Public Safety, No. CV-
01-1463-PHX-LOA, 2006 WL 2168637, at *1 (D. Ariz. 2006). In Arnold, the District Court of Ari-
zona approved a class action settlement agreement between the Arizona Department of Public Safety 
and eleven named plaintiffs, “African-American and Hispanic individuals who were stopped, de-
tained, and searched by DPS officers and drug-detection dogs while traveling on the interstate high-
ways in northern Arizona,” as a part of Operation Pipeline. Id. The settlement included the follow-
ing: provisions prohibiting the use of racial profiling and racial discrimination for the purposes of 
traffic stops and investigations; a modification of traffic stop procedures to prohibit the detention of 
a vehicle and its occupants for investigative purposes for longer than is reasonably necessary to 
accomplish the purpose of the traffic stop; requirement of a written “consent-to-search” the vehicle 
prior to a consensual vehicle search; videotaping of all traffic stops for the duration of all traffic 
stops; special training of all DPS officers in a racial profiling curriculum; and collection and publica-
tion of data regarding traffic stops conflicts for three years from the date of settlement, to be made 
available to the ACLU of Arizona on a semi-annual basis at no cost. Id. at *2–4. While, of course, 
the district court’s decision does not overturn Whren, it indicates willingness on the part of state 
authorities to address obvious, race-based pretextual traffic stops and searches. See also State v. 
Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (granting a motion to suppress evidence ob-
tained in traffic stops resulting from discriminatory enforcement of the traffic laws). 
 60. See MICHAEL D. LYMAN, DRUGS IN SOCIETY 333 (6th ed. 2010) (describing the DEA’s 
nationwide highway drug interdiction program: “[a]lthough Operation Pipeline relies in part on 
training officers to use characteristics to determine potential drug traffickers, it is important to un-
derstand that the program does not advocate such profiling by race or ethnic background” (quoting 
Drug Enforcement Agency, 2007)). 
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Americans and Latinos in “high-crime areas” are more likely to be 
stopped, as are motorists driving beat-up cars and rentals.62 Additionally, 
if police initiate a traffic stop based on a legitimate traffic violation, 
courts uphold it even if the officer making the stop received Operation 
Pipeline training and made a pretextual stop.63 Some states, either by 
statute or as a result of a settlement agreement in a civil rights action, 
                                                                                                                            
 61. See Soto, 734 A.2d at 353 (citing John Lamberth’s New Jersey Turnpike statistical study, 
showing that “a black was 4.85 times as likely as a white to be stopped”); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION OF ARIZ., DRIVING WHILE BLACK OR BROWN 5–14 (2008), available at 
http://acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/DrivingWhileBlackorBrown.pdf (analyzing data col-
lected by the Arizona Department of Public Safety as part of the settlement agreement for Arnold v. 
Arizona Dep’t of Public Safety, and finding that “African Americans, Hispanics and Native Ameri-
cans were searched more frequently than whites and that these search rates are not justified by rates 
of contraband seizures. . . . This finding supports the overall conclusion of this analysis that racial 
and ethnic minorities were treated differently on Arizona interstate highways during the study peri-
od.”); STATE POLICE REV. TEAM, FINAL REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REV. TEAM (1999), available 
at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/Rpt_ii.pdf (finding disparate treatment of minorities in traffic stops); 
NORTHWESTERN UNIV. CTR. FOR PUBLIC SAFETY, ILL. TRAFFIC STOPS STATISTICS STUDY 11 (2007), 
available at http://www.dot.state.il.us/trafficstop/results07.html (“[A]lthough minority drivers are 
about 2.5 times as likely as Caucasian drivers to be the subject of a consent search, they are half as 
likely to have contraband in their vehicle.”); COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE AND INST. ON RACE & 
POVERTY, UNIV. OF MINN. LAW SCHOOL, MINN. STATEWIDE RACIAL PROFILING REPORT: REPORT 
TO THE MINN. LEGISLATURE 22 (2003), available at http://www.law.umn.edu/uploads/cb/ 
94/cb94cf65dc50826424729d214a1f6b82/27-Racial-Profiling-Aggregate-Report.pdf (“[H]igh dis-
cretionary search rates are not justified by high hit rates. American Indians, Blacks, and Latinos were 
all searched more often than Whites even though contraband was found in searches of Whites more 
often than in searches of members of these groups.”). But see JOHN C. LAMBERTH ET AL., FINAL 
REPORT FOR THE SAN ANTONIO POLICE DEP’T 5 (2003) available at http://www.policeforum.org/ 
library/?folderPath=/library/racially-biased-policing/supplemental-resources/#documents (“The 
results of this study are among the ‘best’ that we have seen in our work around the country. They 
provide virtually no evidence for targeting of either Blacks or Hispanics in San Antonio.”). 
 62. C.f. United States v. Monterro-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000) (“It is a 
well-known fact, of which we can take judicial notice, that Mexican males, driving old model Gen-
eral Motors sedans, blend into the morning commuter traffic to transport tons of Mexican marijuana 
from ports of entry in small towns along the Arizona–Sonora border. It is also well known that many 
thousands more Mexican males drive old model General Motors cars to work every morning. This 
phenomenon might justify the installation of a checkpoint where all cars could be inspected, but it 
does not justify the random stopping of ‘suspicious’ looking cars.” (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted)). 
 63. United States v. Harvey, 24 F.3d 795, 796–98 (6th Cir. 1994) (Martin, Jr., J., dissenting) 
(citing police testimony that “[a]lmost every time that we have arrested drug traffickers from Detroit, 
they’re usually young black males driving old cars,” and commenting that “[i]ndeed, by adopting the 
position that the police may stop any automobile with a minor equipment defect, or one whose driver 
commits any petty traffic violation, we have effectively declared that citizens relinquish all meaning-
ful Fourth Amendment protections simply by choosing to enter an automobile. Armed with the com-
forting knowledge—available only in hindsight—that the car in this case did contain contraband, the 
Court has validated a police officer’s mere hunch as the basis for a legitimate traffic stop. In doing 
so, we appear to have abandoned the Fourth Amendment solely to expediency”); Pupo v. State, 371 
S.E.2d 219, 221 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that although the arresting officer had participated in 
Operation Pipeline, his initial detention of defendant’s automobile was based on a valid traffic stop 
and therefore legal). 
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have instituted procedures to track police traffic stops by race.64 Howev-
er, while interesting, this data serves no legal purpose in a criminal ac-
tion, and the burden of proof for a § 1983 action remains so high that it 
might not even help a defendant prove his prima facie case. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not conclusively decided whether the 
exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment applies in an Equal Pro-
tection claim for a racially motivated pretextual arrest, search, or sei-
zure.65 The Court looks with disfavor upon the exclusionary rule as a 
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations; it is very unlikely to adopt the 
remedy in criminal cases for equal protection violations. Some lower 
courts have addressed equal protection claims in criminal cases, explor-
ing and applying remedies with mixed results. Some defendants are suc-
cessful,66 but many courts decline to extend the exclusionary rule to 
Equal Protection challenges altogether because of their readings of 
Whren.67 Without Supreme Court direction, courts have been reluctant to 
                                                        
 64. Several state police agencies collect statistics detailing the race and arrest statistics. For 
many states, those statistics show that African-Americans and Hispanics are statistically more likely 
to be pulled over, arrested, and searched than white drivers. For more details and tables regarding the 
specific numbers, see RONNIE A. DUNN & WORNIE REED, RACIAL PROFILING: CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 64–65 (2011). 
 65. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461 n.2 (1996) (“We have never determined 
whether dismissal of the indictment, or some other sanction, is the proper remedy if a court deter-
mines that a defendant has been the victim of prosecution on the basis of his race.”); United States v. 
Chavez, 281 F.3d 479, 486–87 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor our Court has ruled 
that there is a suppression remedy for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause, and we do not find it necessary to reach that issue here.”); United States v. Benitez, 613 F. 
Supp. 2d 1099, 1101 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (“The remedy for an equal protection violation in the crimi-
nal setting is uncertain, as the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether suppression is an appropriate 
remedy for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 66. See, e.g., United States v. Pollard, 209 F. Supp. 2d 525 (D.V.I. 2002), rev’d on other 
grounds, 326 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2003) (addressing defendant’s motion to have a statement she made 
at an airport suppressed because, she claimed, it was obtained as the result of an unconstitutional 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and a violation of her right to equal protection under the law, 
and granting the motion to suppress based on the following reasoning: “[t]he Supreme Court has not 
closed the door on an equal protection violation forming an independent basis for a motion to sup-
press a search or seizure that results from such discriminatory action. . . . To remedy an equal protec-
tion violation by suppressing the evidentiary fruit of that violation fully comports with the aim of the 
exclusionary rule as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard rights generally. . . . This is 
particularly true given the United States’ position, supported by the Supreme Court in Whren, that 
Pollard may not bring her equal protection claim under her Fourth Amendment motion to suppress. 
It would be a toothless and hollow remedy indeed if the defendant can only bring a separate civil 
lawsuit to vindicate her right to due process and equal protection, as the United States asserts, while 
she is helpless in her criminal prosecution to move to suppress evidence extracted from her during a 
seizure that violates those due process and equal protection rights. . . . To follow what the Govern-
ment of the United States suggests would mock the Constitution and its guarantees of due process 
and equal protection of the laws. I therefore expressly hold that suppression is a viable remedy for an 
equal protection violation” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)). 
 67. C.f. United States v. Montes, No. 07-CR-0064-CVE, 2007 WL 1723492, at *5 (N.D. Okla. 
June 13, 2007) (declining to find a violation of defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights based on 
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apply the exclusionary rule to equal protection claims, even when the 
courts see it as a potentially valid application. As the U.S. District Court 
for Nebraska said, “it is an issue which cries out for resolution by the 
appellate courts.”68 
Only New Jersey courts have granted motions to suppress in Four-
teenth Amendment equal protection claims,69 based on their interpreta-
tion of the New Jersey Constitution.70 To prevail on a motion to suppress 
based on a violation of Equal Protection, New Jersey requires that a de-
fendant establish a prima facie case of selective enforcement and that the 
State fail to rebut that claim.71 In State v. Soto, seventeen African-
American defendants claimed that their arrests on the New Jersey Turn-
pike were a result of discriminatory enforcement of traffic laws by New 
Jersey State Police involved in the Drug Interdiction Training Unit 
(DITU), a program stemming from Operation Pipeline.72 In a selective 
enforcement cause of action, New Jersey law requires the defendant to 
prove the existence of purposeful discrimination.73 Discriminatory intent 
may be inferred from statistical proof presenting a “stark pattern” of dis-
criminatory practices, or even a less extreme pattern in certain contexts.74 
                                                                                                                            
selective enforcement because the initial traffic stop was valid) (citing United States v. Adkins, 1 F. 
App’x 850 (10th Cir. 2001)); United States v. Rendon, No. 2:09-cr-48-WHA, 2010 WL 3879542, at 
*4 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 2010) (“Thus, Whren requires this court look first for a reasonable basis for a 
traffic stop, and if found, an officer’s subjective intentions are to be discarded.”); United States v. 
DeJesus, No. 2:09-CR-22-WKW, 2009 WL 3488690, at *9 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 22, 2009) (“Whren 
requires this court look first for a reasonable basis for a traffic stop, and if found, an officer’s subjec-
tive intentions are to be irrelevant.”). 
 68. United States v. Hare, 308 F. Supp. 2d 955, 961 n.2 (D. Neb. 2004) (“[E]ven if the trooper 
violated the defendants’ rights as alleged, there is little or no federal authority for imposing the rem-
edy of dismissal or suppression. Without precedent from the Supreme Court or the Eighth Circuit 
supporting such a result, I probably would not dismiss this federal criminal case or suppress the 
evidence even if the state trooper violated the defendants’ equal protection and travel rights. Like 
Judge Piester, I do not reach this question, although it is an issue which cries out for resolution by 
the appellate courts. As a practical matter, the federal trial courts need an answer in order to know 
whether the discovery and lengthy evidentiary hearings conducted in this case are ever necessary.”). 
 69. State v. Segars, 172 N.J. 481 (N.J. 2002); State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1996). 
 70. N.J. CONST. of 1947, art. I, para. 1 (“All persons are by nature free and independent, and 
have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life 
and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety 
and happiness.”); Id. para. 5 (“No person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil or military right, 
nor be discriminated against in the exercise of any civil or military right, nor be segregated in the 
militia or in the public schools, because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national 
origin.”). 
 71. Soto, 734 A.2d at 352. 
 72. Id. at 352, 358; see supra note 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 73. Soto, 734 A.2d at 360. 
 74. Id. (“[D]iscriminatory intent may be inferred from statistical proof presenting a stark pat-
tern or an even less extreme pattern in certain limited contexts . . . . [But] discriminatory intent may 
be inferred from statistical proof in a traffic stop context probably because only uniform variables 
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To rebut defendant’s claim, the State must present specific evidence 
“showing that either there actually are defects in the defendant’s evi-
dence which bias the results or missing factors, when properly organized 
and accounted for, eliminate or explain the disparity.”75 The New Jersey 
Superior Court found that the defendants established a de facto policy on 
the part of state police of targeting black drivers for investigation and 
arrest, and that the discretionary power of troopers to stop any car illus-
trated a selection process susceptible to abuse.76 Further, the superior 
court held, “The utter failure of the State Police hierarchy to monitor and 
control a crackdown program like DITU or investigate the many claims 
of institutional discrimination manifests its indifference if not ac-
ceptance.”77 In addition to extensive statistics detailing the racial profil-
ing of black drivers compiled for the defendants, the defense presented 
direct testimony from New Jersey State Police Officers that “they were 
trained and coached to make race based ‘profile’ stops to increase their 
criminal arrests.”78 The court found that defendants met their burden and 
that the State failed to rebut the selective enforcement claim, and it 
granted defendants’ motions to suppress.79   
The U.S. Supreme Court did not reach its decision in Whren for an-
other three months after the Soto decision, but the Soto court recognized 
the importance of objective standards in reviewing police conduct, noting 
that “the courts will not inquire into the motivation of a police officer 
whose stop of a vehicle was based upon a traffic violation committed in 
his presence.”80 More importantly, the Soto court held: 
[W]here objective evidence establishes “that a police agency has 
embarked upon an officially sanctioned or de facto policy of target-
ing minorities for investigation and arrest,” any evidence seized will 
be suppressed to deter future insolence in office by those charged 
with enforcement of the law and to maintain judicial integrity.81 
In State v. Segars,82 the defendant raised a Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection claim in his motion to suppress evidence obtained when 
a police officer ran his license plates on a Mobile Data Terminal (MDT). 
                                                                                                                            
(Title 39 violations) are relevant to the challenged stops and the State has an opportunity to explain 
the statistical disparity.”) (interpreting State v. Kennedy, 588 A.2d 834 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1991)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Soto, 734 A.2d at 360. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 356. 
 79. Id. at 360. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (quoting State v. Kennedy, 588 A.2d 834, 839 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)). 
 82. State v. Segars, 799 A.2d 541, 547 (N.J. 2002). 
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey articulated its standard for proving 
discriminatory targeting.83 The court found that the defendant had estab-
lished a prima facie case of discriminatory targeting through the defend-
ant’s testimony, documentary evidence, and the arresting officer’s inac-
curate testimony, and that the State failed to rebut this claim by offering 
a race-neutral basis for its action.84 Running license plates prior to a stop 
does not constitute a search, nor does it implicate Fourth Amendment 
concerns; however, the New Jersey Supreme Court said that police may 
not base checking license plates on race or other impermissible criteria.85 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, granting the 
motion to suppress evidence of the defendant’s suspended driver’s li-
cense and finding that race solely motivated the officer’s use of the 
MDT. The court reasoned: 
Once it has been established that selective enforcement has occurred 
. . . the fruits of that search will be suppressed. The rationales that 
support the suppression of evidence . . . namely, deterrence of im-
permissible investigatory behavior and maintenance of the integrity 
of the judicial system, apply equally, if not more so, to cases of ra-
cial targeting.86 
The Sixth Circuit also expressed willingness to consider exclusion 
of evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause 
before falling in line with Whren and limiting equal protection challenges 
to § 1983 civil rights cases and not criminal cases.87 In United States v. 
Avery,88 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of defend-
ant’s motion to suppress cocaine recovered from his carry-on bag in an 
airport. The defendant, a young African-American man, argued to ex-
clude the evidence because airport officials targeted, pursued, and inter-
viewed him based solely on his race.89 He argued that they seized his bag 
without reasonable suspicion and unreasonably detained him in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.90 He did not challenge his ultimate arrest un-
der the Fourth Amendment, but he offered a Fourteenth Amendment 
                                                        
 83. Id. at 551 (“We apply a similar analysis to this record. When a defendant claims that an 
MDT check was based on his race, he bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case by produc-
ing relevant evidence that would support an inference of discriminatory enforcement. If the defend-
ant does so, the burden shifts to the State to produce evidence of a race-neutral reason for the check. 
Ultimately, the defendant bears the burden of proving discriminatory treatment by a preponderance 
or greater weight of the credible evidence.”). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 548–49 (citations omitted). 
 87. United States v. Navarro-Camacho, 186 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 88. United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 89. Id. at 346. 
 90. Id. 
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challenge to the officers’ actions leading up to his encounter.91 The court 
commented, 
Although Fourth Amendment principles regarding unreasonable 
seizures do not apply to consensual encounters, an officer does not 
have unfettered discretion to conduct an investigatory interview 
with a citizen. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides citizens a degree of protection independent of 
the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. This protection becomes relevant even before a sei-
zure occurs. . . . If law enforcement adopts a policy, employs a prac-
tice, or in a given situation takes steps to initiate an investigation of 
a citizen based solely upon that citizen’s race, without more, then a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause has occurred.92 
However, the court found that the evidence Avery presented fell short of 
proving a prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause, and the 
court did not order the evidence suppressed. 
In United States v. Taylor,93 another consensual encounter case in-
volving airport security, the Sixth Circuit did not find that security se-
lected the defendant for a consensual interview because he was African-
American. However, the court held that if law enforcement officers at the 
Memphis airport “implemented a general practice or pattern that primari-
ly targeted minorities for consensual interviews, or . . . incorporated a 
racial component into the drug courier profile,”94 those facts would give 
rise to “due process and equal protection constitutional implications cog-
nizable by this court.”95 Likewise in United States v. Jennings,96 the 
Sixth Circuit held that “[a] law enforcement officer would be acting un-
constitutionally were he to approach and consensually interview a person 
of color solely because of that person’s color, absent a compelling justi-
fication . . . [and] evidence seized in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause should be suppressed.”97 
In Farm Labor Organizing Committee v. Ohio State Highway Pa-
trol, the Northern District of Ohio closed the door on equal protection 
challenges for evidence seized in a pretextual traffic stop, leaving only a 
§ 1983 suit as an option for Hispanic motorists pulled over and searched 
                                                        
 91. Id. at 352. 
 92. Id. at 352, 355. 
 93. United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 578–79 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 94. Id. at 579. 
 95. Id. 
 96. United States v. Jennings, No. 91-5942, 1993 WL 5927, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 1993). 
 97. Id. at *4. 
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based on their ethnicity.98 Shortly thereafter, the Sixth Circuit followed 
suit in United States v. Navarro-Camacho.99 In Navarro-Camacho, a de-
fendant moved to suppress evidence obtained after police searched his 
automobile when they stopped him for a valid traffic violation and sub-
jected him to a positive canine narcotic inspection.100 The Sixth Circuit 
upheld the stop because police based the decision to stop the defendant’s 
automobile on a valid traffic violation and likewise found the necessary 
probable cause to justify the subsequent search of the car.101 Judge 
Moore concurred but commented that, “[i]n a proper case, I believe that a 
defendant . . . could achieve suppression of the evidence or dismissal of 
the prosecution by demonstrating that the investigatory practice had a 
discriminatory purpose and a discriminatory effect,”102 and advised that 
“[t]he district courts should remain open . . . to the possibility of Four-
teenth Amendment selective enforcement challenges in future criminal 
prosecutions.”103 
However, the Sixth Circuit closed this door in dicta in a recent con-
sensual search case: 
While we, of course, agree with the general proposition that selec-
tive enforcement of the law based on a suspect’s race may violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment, we do not agree that the proper remedy 
for such violations is necessarily suppression of evidence otherwise 
lawfully obtained. . . . Even if the Fourth Amendment were impli-
cated, any challenge to a search or seizure based on legitimate prob-
able cause, but in which it is alleged the officer’s subjective motive 
was discriminatory, is doomed to fail.104 
The court reasoned that aside from Judge Moore’s dissent in Navarro-
Camacho and the holdings in New Jersey, which were based on provi-
                                                        
 98. Farm Labor Organizing Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 991 F. Supp. 895, 902 (N.D. 
Ohio 1997), aff’d, 308 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2002) (“In the case at bar, if defendants stopped the plain-
tiffs’ vehicle for violations of motor vehicle laws, the stop was ‘reasonable’ and thus not violative of 
the Fourth Amendment.”); Farm Labor Organizing Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 
523, 533 (6th Cir. 2002) (construing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)) (“Similarly, the 
Supreme Court, in Whren v. United States, confirmed that an officer’s discriminatory motivations for 
pursuing a course of action can give rise to an Equal Protection claim, even where there are suffi-
cient objective indicia of suspicion to justify the officer’s actions under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 99. United States v. Navarro-Camacho, 186 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 100. Id. at 703–704. 
 101. Id. at 705, 708–09. 
 102. Id. at 711 (Moore, J., concurring). 
 103. Id. at 711–12. 
 104. United States v. Nichols, 512 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds 
by United States v. Burton, 632 F.3d 264 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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sions of the New Jersey Constitution, no other court has applied suppres-
sion as a remedy without a concomitant Fourth Amendment violation.105 
D. Reasserting the Fourth Amendment in Traffic Stops 
The Equal Protection Clause is unlikely to provide a workable na-
tional solution to pretextual traffic stops. If courts seek a solution, they 
will find it within the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness command 
through reconsideration of Whren.106 Whren’s rule that the only inquiry 
is whether there was probable cause or reasonable suspicion for a traffic 
violation to justify a traffic stop is premised upon the Court’s inability to 
develop a broader more sophisticated inquiry to test the legitimacy of 
traffic stops. The Whren inquiry should be only the first step because it 
fails to offer a complete and final inquiry. The Fourth Amendment was 
intended to limit and control the exercise of police discretion. A test that 
ratifies pretextual stops does not meet that purpose. 
The Court should permit the defendant to challenge a stop as 
pretextual even when there is probable cause that a traffic violation oc-
curred. The defendant would carry the heavy burden. Such a claim could 
only be cobbled together by evidence of many factors: (1) the serious-
ness of the traffic offense; (2) the officer’s own testimony (which will 
rarely contain an admission of pretext); (3) statistical evidence demon-
strating that the officer or the department targets minority drivers or uses 
traffic control to investigate nontraffic offenses; (4) whether the officer 
was on the street for traffic control or for investigating other offenses; (5) 
departmental regulations governing similar stops; (6) whether reasonable 
                                                        
 105. Id. at 794 n.4. 
 106. One alternative solution is the use of state highway safety funds to encourage states to 
track data on racial profiling in traffic stops and to implement programs to prevent pretextual traffic 
stops. For example, the Department of Transportation will offer a Racial Profiling Prohibition Grant 
to a state if it: “1) Enact[s] and enforce[s] a law that prohibits the use of racial profiling in the en-
forcement of state laws regulating the use of federal-aid highways, and 2) Maintain[s] and allow[s] 
public inspection of race and ethnicity data for each motor vehicle stop made by law enforcement 
officials on federal-aid highways,” or “[p]rovide[s] assurances to the Department of Transportation 
that the state [is] undertaking activities to comply with 1) and 2).” Section 1906 Racial Profiling 
Prohibition Grants, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASSOC., http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/ 
programs/1906.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2012, 8:39 PM) (citing Grant Program to Prohibit Racial 
Profiling, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1468 (2005) (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 402)). States may use 
these funds to collect data on racial profiling in traffic stops, evaluate the results, and use that data to 
develop and implement programs to curb pretextual traffic stops. Id. However, the use of highway 
funds under the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, is subject to 
the limiting factors set forth in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Under Dole, Congress 
may attach conditions on receipt of funds and use the power to further policy objectives, as long as 
the funds are attached to a program that (1) furthers the general welfare, (2) is clear and unambigu-
ous in its goals, (3) is directly tied to the states’ use of those funds, (4) does not violate any other 
Constitutional provision that would be an independent bar to the program, and (5) is not coercive. Id. 
at 207–08. 
2013] Driving Without the Fourth Amendment 1433 
officers would have made the stop under the same circumstances; and (7) 
any other relevant factors. The factors combine subjective and objective 
elements to reach a reasonableness determination that should always be a 
fact-based determination. The expanded inquiry is intended to be limited. 
The burden on the defense would not be an easy one and would not often 
be met. It is intended to isolate and identify egregious examples of 
pretextual traffic stops. It is also intended to allow this society to declare 
that pretextual stops and arrests are unconstitutional and that we will not 
tolerate obvious examples of pretextual traffic stops. The substituted test 
is not a perfect solution, but it is better than the Whren test because it 
allows for inquiry beyond the initial question of whether there was a traf-
fic infraction. The possibility of a Fourth Amendment challenge, itself, 
may impose some restraints on police conduct and departmental policies 
that have fed on Whren and made pretextual traffic stops the rule. 
III. POLICE INTERACTION WITH MOTORISTS 
Thirty years ago, I laughed when young police officers attending 
police training programs offered at our law school boasted to me that 
they could stop every car legally for at least ten traffic violations. I am 
not laughing any longer. Do you always signal when you move into or 
from a parking spot at the curb when there is no other traffic around?107 
Do you religiously signal lane shifts or turns when there is no other traf-
fic in sight?108 When driving on a highway, do you drift ever so slightly 
across the right berm line?109 Is your window tint too dark?110 
                                                        
 107. See, e.g., People v. Haywood, 944 N.E.2d 846 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (upholding arrest based 
on statute that required a turn signal when leaving a parallel-parking spot). Compare State v. Brun-
ner, No. 2007CA00285, 2008 WL 4118902, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2008) (upholding a stop 
in violation of Canton ordinance requiring motorist to signal when moving toward the curb to park), 
with State v. Davidson, No. 22442, 2009 WL 1387333, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 15, 2009) (“In the 
present case, Officer Kennard testified that he observed a traffic violation when he saw Davidson’s 
vehicle [leave its parking spot] ‘pulling into traffic’ without signaling. Officer Kennard then stated 
that he stopped the vehicle for ‘failing to use a signal pulling into the lane of traffic.’ As set forth 
above, pulling into a lane of traffic without signaling does not violate R.C.G.O. 72.05 if no other 
vehicles are present. In light of Officer Kennard’s additional testimony, however, that he saw Da-
vidson ‘pulling into traffic,’ the trial court could have inferred that at least one other vehicle was 
present nearby on East Third Street. Therefore, Officer Kennard had reasonable, articulable suspi-
cion of a traffic violation, which was sufficient to justify a traffic stop.” (citation omitted) (emphasis 
in original)). 
 108. See, e.g., People v. Tamburrino, 892 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. City Ct. 2009) (holding that a 
New York law requiring a signal to indicate a right or left turn places an absolute duty on the driver 
to signal regardless of traffic conditions); State v. Bartone, No. 22920, 2009 WL 104885, at *3 
(Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2009) (“What is of significance is that these cases stand for the proposition 
that Ordinance 71.31 imposes an absolute duty as to giving turn signals that is not conditioned on 
prevailing traffic conditions. The legislature, in enacting R.C. 4511.39, and the Dayton City Com-
mission, in enacting Ordinance 71.31, could have expressly made the duty to signal dependent on 
traffic conditions but did not. Indeed, such language might well introduce an undesirable element of 
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Compliance with an officer’s command to stop a vehicle is never a 
consensual encounter,111 and the order to stop must always be objectively 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Most courts have assumed that 
not only probable cause, the standard for an arrest, but also reasonable 
suspicion, the standard for a Terry investigative stop, must support a traf-
fic stop.112 Any time police order the driver of an automobile to stop, the 
stop constitutes a seizure of the driver and his passengers, governed by 
Fourth Amendment standards,113 and the driver may challenge that aspect 
of the encounter. In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court held “people 
are not shorn of their Fourth Amendment protection when they step from 
their homes onto the public sidewalks or from the sidewalks into their 
                                                                                                                            
subjectivity which would be a disservice to the motoring public and law enforcement alike.” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
 109. See, e.g., State v. Batchili, 865 N.E.2d 1282 (Ohio 2007) (crossing over marked lines 
violated R.C. 4511.33 which constitutes a minor misdemeanor); Yuskiewicz v. State, No. 591, 2011 
WL 798136, at *1 (Del. Mar. 8, 2011) (crossing over center line in a wide right turn violated the 
statute governing right turns); Stephens v. State, 18 A.3d 168, 178 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (“As 
previously stated, pavement markings designating lanes of travel constitute ‘traffic control devices.’ 
Because appellant was seen swerving from lane to lane ‘[s]everal times,’ the evidence was more than 
sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction for failure to obey a traffic control device.” (brackets in 
original)); Dods v. State, 240 P.3d 1208 (Wyo. 2010) (holding defendant’s one instance of crossing 
the fog line by approximately eight inches for approximately five seconds, or several hundred yards, 
violated the “‘single lane of travel statute’”); State v. Malone, 56 So.3d 336 (La. Ct. App. 2010) 
(violating a statute stating “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single 
lane” for no apparent reason provided police with probable cause to believe a traffic violation for 
improper lane usage occurred). 
 110. See, e.g., United States v. Stafford, No. 4:10–CR–75–FL, 2011 WL 2358058, at *4 
(E.D.N.C. June 9, 2011) (“[P]olice officers had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop based on a 
suspect window-tinting violation, had reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity due to 
defendant’s nervous and evasive demeanor, and had probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle 
without a warrant after a drug detection dog alerted.”); United States v. Matias-Maestres, 738 F. 
Supp. 2d 281, 293 (D.P.R. 2010) (“[T]he officers’ observation of the dark tint of the Ford Ranger’s 
windows gave them probable cause to pull over the vehicle in order to investigate a possible viola-
tion of Puerto Rico traffic law. Thus, any ulterior motive of the officers for stopping the pickup is 
irrelevant to the stop’s constitutionality.”); People v. Carter, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010) (having excessive window tint lawfully gave rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
necessary to conduct a traffic stop). 
 111. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988). 
 112. Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Rou-
tine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1848 (2004) (“But if, as is clear, 
probable cause is a permissible basis for a traffic stop, is it the only basis, or will some lesser stand-
ard also suffice, such as the reasonable-suspicion standard approved in Terry v. Ohio for certain 
investigative stops? Most courts have assumed the latter, i.e., that traffic stops as a class are permis-
sible without probable cause if there exists reasonable suspicion, that is, merely equivocal evidence. 
Such an assumption is to be found in the federal-court decisions of the various circuits, as well as in 
the decisions of most states. In most of these cases the matter has not even been put into issue by the 
defendant (often because it appears the stop would pass muster even under the probable-cause test), 
but on the rare occasions when the defendant has made a contrary claim it is often rather summarily 
dismissed.” (footnote omitted)). 
 113. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). 
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automobiles.”114 Fourth Amendment standards govern safety checks, 
DUI checks, traffic stops and arrests, Terry stops, arrests, and search-
es.115 The Supreme Court said that such Fourth Amendment standards 
are implicated even if “the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting 
detention quite brief.”116 
The Fourth Amendment’s proscription of random, suspicionless 
searches and seizures applies to the stops of automobiles. A vehicle, its 
driver, and its passengers are no more subject to a random, suspicionless 
stop than is a pedestrian.117 Cars may not be randomly stopped by the 
police to check a driver’s identification, license, and automobile registra-
tion.118 
The Fourth Amendment command of reasonableness is not trig-
gered until an officer orders a motorist to pull over.119 A police officer 
may target a car before the officer observes a motorist commit a traffic 
offense, allowing the officer to follow a targeted car until the driver vio-
lates a traffic law.120 Police surveillance of a motorist does not implicate 
the Fourth Amendment as long as it occurs “unobtrusively and do[es] not 
limit defendant’s freedom of movement by so doing.”121 Part of surveil-
                                                        
 114. Id. at 664–65. 
 115. Compare Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, with State v. Burroughs, 955 A.2d 43, 52 (Conn. 2008) 
(“The officers were uniformed and armed but never unholstered or even gripped their firearms. 
Although we recognize that a uniformed law enforcement officer is necessarily cloaked with an aura 
of authority, this cannot, in and of itself, constitute a show of authority sufficient to satisfy the test 
for a seizure under Mendenhall.”). 
 116. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653. 
 117. See Prouse, 440 U.S. 648. 
 118. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (“In the absence of any basis for suspecting ap-
pellant of misconduct, the balance between the public interest and appellant’s right to personal secu-
rity and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference. . . . When such a stop is not based 
on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits.”); see 
also State v. Garland, 482 A.2d 139, 142–43 (Me. 1984) (“Random stops of pedestrians or of drivers 
of motor vehicles while parked, as well as of moving automobiles, for purposes of identification and 
checking of drivers’ licenses and auto registrations, absent compliance with Terry requirements, are 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”); People v. Maksymenko, 432 N.Y.S.2d 328 (N.Y. 
Crim. Ct. 1980) (holding that a police officer can only ask for identification if he reasonably believes 
a crime will be committed and under New York law a citizen has no duty to respond to an officer’s 
inquiry); State v. Holly, No. 92057, 2009 WL 1819491, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 25, 2009) (“In 
America, however, the police may not stop an individual for the sole purpose of compelling him to 
identify himself.”). 
 119. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648. 
 120. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 121. People v. Thornton, 667 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); see also United States 
v. Terry, No. 05-10202-RWZ, 2006 WL 1716737, at *1 (D. Mass. June 20, 2006); United States v. 
Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Commonwealth v. Grandison, 741 N.E.2d 25, 30 
(Mass. 2001) (following someone for the purpose of surveillance is not “pursuit” for purposes of 
determining whether reasonable suspicion is required). 
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lance inevitably includes a check of the motorist’s license plate.122 For 
Fourth Amendment purposes, police seize a vehicle, motorist, and pas-
sengers once an officer activates a cruiser’s overhead lights or forces a 
car over.123 
An important state interest exists in maintaining public safety on 
our streets and highways and represents a valid exercise of police pow-
er.124 State and municipal ordinances contain a myriad of regulations to 
promote highway safety,125 but a particular violation or the subsequent 
police discretion to stop the motorist for the violation may not necessari-
ly implicate safety-related regulations. Over the years, these regulations 
have multiplied so rapidly that police officers have multiple opportuni-
ties to stop individual motorists when the underlying reason for the stop 
is not necessarily related to safety but the officer’s wish to investigate the 
motorist for other crimes. This multitude of offenses allows a police of-
ficer to stop almost any motorist.126 
                                                        
 122. See, e.g., United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Diaz-
Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557 (6th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Sparks, 37 F. App’x 826 (8th Cir. 2002); Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 
F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 123. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007). 
 124. See In re Park Beyond the Park, 157 B.R. 887 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) (regulating automo-
bile traffic by municipalities maintains traffic safety and directly connects with public health and 
welfare); Bricker v. Craven, 391 F. Supp. 601 (D. Mass. 1975) (holding that state officials have wide 
degree of discretion in dealing with traffic regulation). 
 125. See supra note 18. 
 126. See Peter Shakow, Let He Who Never Has Turned Without Signaling Cast the First Stone: 
An Analysis of Whren v. U.S., 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 627, 628 (1997) (“[The decision in Whren] allows 
the police unfettered discretion to stop motorists for any traffic violation as a pretext to investigate 
other unrelated offenses. A police officer need have nothing more than an unsubstantiated hunch, or 
even an illegitimate bias, that a motorist is engaged in drug or other criminal activity to pull him or 
her over, if even the most minor traffic infraction has been committed.”); see also State v. Boudette, 
791 P.2d 1063, 1068 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (“Citing motorists as they violate traffic laws helps en-
sure that they will obey the laws and also provides law-enforcement agents with the opportunity to 
check whether motorists have complied with licensing requirements. This is a reasonable exercise of 
the state’s police power.”); United States v. Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1160 (D. Kan. 
2004) (“Officers are faced with multiple violations by multiple motorists, requiring a choice of 
whom to stop. Officers know that effecting a stop of one motorist may prevent them from stopping a 
more serious violation they observe while they are in the middle of processing that stop. Thus, they 
make decisions about when and when not to stop. This endowed discretion is necessary and appro-
priate for the effective enforcement of traffic laws and for the effective protection of public safety.”); 
Fertig v. State, 146 P.3d 492, 501 (Wyo. 2006) (“‘Because the Vehicle and Traffic Law provides an 
objective grid upon which to measure probable cause, a stop based on that standard is not arbitrary in 
the context of constitutional search and seizure jurisprudence. . . . [P]robable cause stops are not 
based on the discretion of police officers. They are based on violations of law. An officer may 
choose to stop someone for a ‘minor’ violation after considering a number of factors, including 
traffic and weather conditions, but the officer’s authority to stop a vehicle is circumscribed by the 
requirement of a violation of a duly enacted law. In other words, it is the violation of a statute that 
both triggers the officer’s authority to make the stop and limits the officer’s discretion.’” (quoting 
People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 646 (N.Y. 2001)) (brackets and ellipsis in original)). 
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In Whren v. United States, the petitioners tried to raise this issue in 
the Supreme Court, arguing, as Justice Scalia phrased it, “that the ‘multi-
tude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations’ is so large and so 
difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyone is guilty of violation, 
permitting the police to single out almost whomever they wish for a 
stop.”127 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia simply dismissed 
this argument: 
[W]e are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at 
what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly 
violated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure 
of the lawfulness of enforcement. And even if we could identify 
such exorbitant codes, we do not know by what standard (or what 
right) we would decide, as petitioners would have us do, which par-
ticular provisions are sufficiently important to merit enforcement. 
For the run-of-the-mine case, which this surely is, we think there is 
no realistic alternative to the traditional common-law rule that prob-
able cause justifies a search and seizure.128 
The Court should have found some traffic offenses so trivial and under-
enforced by reasonable officers that a seizure for such a minor violation 
violates the Fourth Amendment guarantee to be free from unreasonable 
seizures. Such a stop led to the arrest in United States v. Harvey,129 where 
the motorist was travelling on an interstate three miles over the speed 
limit.130 It would seem that such a stop should raise a red flag requiring 
an evaluation of the underlying offense that would not precipitate a stop 
by other officers. Given the reality that officers cannot possibly stop all 
motorists for violations, the courts must be willing to recognize that the 
grounds for certain stops are so trivial (for example, driving on a high-
way three miles over the limit) that they actually reflect inappropriate 
pretext. Otherwise, police would likely stop only the most egregious of-
fenders. 
A. Consensual Encounters with Motorists 
Not all interactions between law enforcement and individuals im-
plicate the Fourth Amendment.131 For example, police officers often 
make investigative inquiries of the occupants of parked cars without the 
use of force or a show of authority, thereby making the encounter “con-
                                                        
 127. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996). 
 128. Id. at 818–19. 
 129. See United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 130. Id. at 113 (Keith, J., dissenting). 
 131. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). 
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sensual.”132 If an encounter with a law enforcement officer is found to be 
consensual, there has not been a Fourth Amendment seizure,133 and the 
requirement that the encounter be supported by reasonable suspicion dis-
appears. Any level of force transforms a consensual encounter into an 
investigative Terry stop requiring reasonable suspicion.134 
A consensual encounter may take place when a police officer walks 
over to talk with the occupants of a parked car.135 Likewise, courts may 
                                                        
 132. C.f. United States v. Graham, 323 F. App’x 793 (11th Cir. 2009) (parking police vehicles 
around the defendant’s car is not a show of force that indicates a seizure); Baker v. State, 684 S.E.2d 
427 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (walking over to the defendant while at a truck stop did not constitute a 
seizure); State v. Thompson, 793 N.W.2d 185, 187 (N.D. 2011) (finding a police-civilian encounter 
is not a seizure if the officer approaches a parked car and asks questions in a “conversational man-
ner”); People v. Black, 872 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment was not invoked because the car was already stopped when police officers arrived and 
“they did not park their patrol vehicle in such a manner as to block the driveway in which the vehicle 
was parked”). 
 133. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (plurality) (ruling that a voluntary 
encounter does not rise to level of seizure). 
 134. Cf. United States v. Jones, 562 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that submitting to a 
show of force by police constitutes a seizure); State v. Casas, 900 A.2d 1120 (R.I. 2006) (concluding 
that a police officer who halts a vehicle on a highway seizes the driver and passenger for Fourth 
Amendment purposes and makes them subject to the officer’s authority); see also United States v. 
Maltais, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 (D.N.D. 2003) (“Assuming, as Maltais seems to contend in his 
affidavit, that Agent Danley’s questioning was so intimidating, threatening or coercive that Maltais 
did not believe he was free to leave, the Court finds that once Agent Danley instructed Maltais to 
wait in his truck, the circumstances changed from a consensual encounter into a Terry stop.”); In re 
Brill, No. 08CA0015, 2009 WL 1041439, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2009) (“Corporal 
Eckelberry admitted that had appellant pulled out of the driveway and left, he would have stopped 
him by a show of authority. We conclude [that] even though it appears by the facts to be a consensu-
al encounter, appellant was not free to refuse to give him his driver’s license.”). 
 135. See United States v. Baker, 290 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that a police officer 
who walked over to idling car and identified himself did not convey to the defendant that his liberty 
was restrained because he did not tell the motorist to turn off the car, he did not display his weapon, 
and he did not use any language or tone indicating compliance with his request was compelled); 
State v. Kasparian, 937 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (finding a stop to be consensual 
because “the officers approached wearing uniforms, badges, and weapons and did not even an-
nounce themselves before Kasparian threw down the drugs”); People v. Luedemann, 857 N.E.2d 
187, 208 (Ill. 2006) (“[I]t is clear that Officer Pate did not effectuate a seizure of defendant before 
observing an open bottle and signs of defendant’s intoxication. Rather, precedent shows that Officer 
Pate acted exactly as a well-trained police officer should when he wishes to question a person seated 
in a parked vehicle without effectuating a seizure. He drove past defendant’s vehicle so as not to 
block it in its space. He did not turn on his overhead flashing lights to signal that defendant’s com-
pliance was expected. He did not use coercive language or a coercive tone of voice, he did not touch 
defendant, and he did not display his weapon. He approached from the rear driver’s side, as he was 
trained to do, and he used a flashlight because it was nighttime. Objectively viewed, nothing Officer 
Pate did would communicate to a reasonable person, innocent of any wrongdoing, that he was not 
free to decline to answer Officer Pate’s questions or otherwise go about his business.”); State v. 
Boys, 716 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (“A seizure does not occur simply because a police 
officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. An encounter that does not involve physi-
cal force or a show of authority does not necessarily implicate the Fourth Amendment.”); State v. 
Mesley, 732 N.E.2d 477, 481 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (“While the expectation of privacy in automo-
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construe an encounter occurring on private property as consensual.136 
Some courts take the position that a police officer who walks over to talk 
to the driver of a vehicle temporarily stopped at a traffic light or stop sign 
has not necessarily forcibly detained the occupant; rather, whether it is a 
forcible seizure or a consensual encounter depends on the facts of the 
encounter.137 When a police officer pulls behind a car stopped at a gaso-
line service station and activates the overhead light on the cruiser, one 
court said, “[N]o reasonable person would have felt free to leave the gas 
station . . . .”138 
The Supreme Court has provided limited guidance in determining 
what constitutes a consensual encounter, stating that the inquiry turns on 
whether a reasonable person under the circumstances would feel free to 
leave.139 If a reasonable person under the circumstances would have felt 
free to leave, yet the driver chose to remain and continue to interact with 
the police officer, the encounter is consensual.140 This fiction lacks any 
understanding of the relationship between police and citizens. Few citi-
zens have any understanding of the law, and fewer feel empowered to 
                                                                                                                            
biles may be diluted, people do not abandon all privacy expectations when occupying parked vehi-
cles in a public parking lot on business premises. The cases cited by appellant demonstrate that law 
enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion to investigate a parked vehicle before they discovered 
evidence in ‘plain view,’ or prior to making a decision to investigate a particular individual, discov-
ered evidence in ‘open view’ within a vehicle. Here, the discovery of a bag of Dilaudid in appellee’s 
lap in ‘open view’ did not trigger the officer’s investigation.” (citations omitted)); State v. Maxie, 
230 P.3d 69 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (ruling that an officer’s encounter with a driver slumped down in a 
parked car was a consensual encounter even though the car was located in an area frequented by 
prostitutes; the officer simply approached the car to ask the driver questions regarding his presence 
in the area). 
 136. See State v. Gahner, 554 N.W.2d 818 (N.D. 1996) (holding that approaching a vehicle did 
not constitute a seizure because the defendant was parked in a private parking lot after hours; the 
officer had sufficient basis to approach and inquire about his presence); State v. Ball, No. 2009-T-
0013, 2010 WL 702291, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2010) (“It is well-settled that an encounter 
may be consensual when a police officer approaches and questions individuals in or near a parked 
car. Further, an encounter may be consensual if it occurs on private property.” (citation, internal 
quotation marks, and alterations omitted)). 
 137. See, e.g., People v. Ocasio, 652 N.E.2d 907, 908 (N.Y. 1995) (“Enough was shown here 
to create a fact question as to whether a seizure occurred, and the trial court considered the appropri-
ate factors. Defendant’s progress was halted by a stoplight, not the police. The officers approached 
on foot, displayed badges and asked for identification. No sirens or lights were used to interfere with 
defendant’s transit; no gun was displayed; and defendant was at no time prevented from departing. 
Defendant consented to accompany the officers to the precinct, and thus was not forcibly detained. 
While there may be instances in which approach of a car at a stoplight constitutes a seizure, the 
courts below, having considered the relevant factors, found no seizure. We cannot say, as a matter of 
law, that this determination was wrong.”). 
 138. State v. Broom, No. 22468, 2008 WL 4447698, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2008). 
 139. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572 (1988) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality)). 
 140. Id. 
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refuse a police officer’s request.141 Moreover, in some contexts, it would 
be dangerous for the motorist to test whether he is free to terminate the 
encounter and drive off. The number of officers, whether or not they 
draw their weapons, the presence of flashing lights,142 the words used, 
and the tone of the officer’s questioning factor into the determination of 
whether a reasonable person would have felt free to refuse to cooperate 
and drive off.143 Recreating exact words and tone of voice at a later court 
hearing is problematic; it results in a he-said-she-said swearing contest. 
The words and tone used during traffic encounters likely differ from their 
presentation in court during a suppression hearing, but a judge ruling on 
                                                        
 141. James A. Adams, Saint Louis University Public Law Review 1993 Symposium: Violence, 
Crime and Punishment Search and Seizure as Seen by Supreme Court Justices: Are They Serious or 
Is This Just Judicial Humor?, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 413, 440–41 (1993) (“On the other 
hand, citizens have a right to free movement on public streets and the right to refuse to discuss iden-
tity or other information with police. In the clash of rights, police rights now prevail. Virtually any 
on-the-street police conduct can now qualify as either a consensual stop or a Terry stop. Citizens are 
caught in a ‘Catch 22.’ Exercise of citizen rights in face of police rights may cause police to escalate 
the intrusiveness of the encounter and place the citizen at risk of both physical harm and formal 
arrest. Failure to exercise citizen rights by responding to the officer, however, may be viewed as 
consensual conduct removing the encounter from Fourth Amendment analysis.” (footnote and cita-
tions omitted)). 
 142. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 95 F. App’x 957, 960 (10th Cir. 2004) (determining that 
“a police car’s flashing lights and sirens provide a clear direction to stop” and thus constitute a sei-
zure of the vehicle); State v. Donahue, 742 A.2d 775 (Conn. 1999) (holding that a reasonable person 
would not feel free to leave after a police vehicle pulled up with its overhead flashing lights activat-
ed); State v. Mireles, 991 P.2d 878, 880 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (“Here by contrast, [the officer’s] act 
of turning on the overhead lights, although not necessarily intended to create a detention, did consti-
tute a technical, de facto detention commanding Mireles to remain stopped . . . .”). But see G.M. v. 
State, 19 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 2009) (concluding that pulling up behind a juvenile driver in an unmarked 
car with flashing lights did not constitute a seizure because the driver did not see the lights or realize 
the police were there); State v. Brown, No. CA2001-04-047, 2001 WL 1567340, at *3 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2001) (“A police officer does not necessarily seize the occupants of a parked vehicle through 
the activation of a police cruiser’s overhead lights.”). 
 143. Cf. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203–04 (2002) (“When Officer Lang ap-
proached respondents, he did not brandish a weapon or make any intimidating movements. He left 
the aisle free so that respondents could exit. He spoke to passengers one by one and in a polite, quiet 
voice. Nothing he said would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was barred from leaving 
the bus or otherwise terminating the encounter.”); People v. Ocasio, 652 N.E.2d 907 (N.Y. 1995) 
(ruling defendant’s progress was halted by a stoplight, not the police; the officers approached on 
foot, displayed badges and asked for identification; no sirens or lights were used to interfere with the 
defendant’s transit; no gun was displayed; and at no time was defendant prevented from departing); 
United States v. Jones, 374 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding a consensual encounter was 
elevated to a traffic stop when the Government failed to establish that officers issued no commands 
to defendant, displayed no weapons or handcuffs, and did not demand identification, nor what the 
questioning officer’s tone of voice was and whether multiple police cars blocked defendant’s path); 
United States v. Ruesga-Ramos, 815 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (“Where a trooper 
turns off his patrol vehicle’s overhead lights, issues a warning, and tells a driver that he is free to go, 
the driver would conclude that the stop is over and that he may leave. The driver would understand 
that he need not answer any further questions. Thus, if the driver does decide to remain, the trooper 
could reasonably believe that the driver’s decision to do so is consensual.”). 
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a motion to suppress is more likely to believe the police officer than the 
defendant whose car yielded contraband. 
B. Checkpoint Stops 
Some stops, while activating the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable-
ness command, need not be based on individualized facts and circum-
stances giving rise to a reasonable belief that the motorist committed a 
traffic offense.144 Such stops provide a way around the prohibition 
against randomly stopping a vehicle to check the motorist’s driver’s li-
cense and car registration by allowing stops of all motorists.145 Brief 
checkpoint stops fall within Fourth Amendment seizures but remain 
permissible so long as they do not single out a particular car or driver. 
The purpose of the checkpoint stop is to promote safety on the high-
way.146 Permissible checkpoint stops include checking drivers’ licenses 
and vehicle registrations147 and checking for impaired driving.148 Check-
point stops are illegal when they are used for “general crime control.”149 
                                                        
 144. In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court disapproved the police stop of a vehicle to 
determine whether the motorist was a licensed driver. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). The Court found the stop 
illegal because it involved a random check of a motorist on the whim of police officers. Id. at 658. 
The Court indicated that the questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops would be 
permissible. Id.; see also United States v. Henson, 351 F. App’x. 818, 821 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that reasonableness and intrusiveness of a checkpoint stop are evaluated by weighing the following 
factors: “[W]hether the checkpoint: (1) is clearly visible; (2) is part of some systematic procedure 
that strictly limits the discretionary authority of police officers; and (3) detains drivers no longer than 
is reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of checking a license and registration, unless 
other facts come to light creating a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity”); United States v. 
Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 557 (6th Cir. 1998) (“At a checkpoint, every single person is stopped, not 
just those persons who have violated a traffic law. Thus, a driver, who has violated no traffic law, 
whom an officer could not stop for a pretextual purpose away from the checkpoint, may be subjected 
to a pretextual stop merely for choosing to travel the road on which a checkpoint has been erected.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 145. See supra note 62. 
 146. See Mich. Dep’t. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 460–62 (1990). 
 147. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 660, 663 n.26 (holding that “[i]n terms of actually discovering unli-
censed drivers or deterring them from driving, the spot check does not appear sufficiently productive 
to qualify as a reasonable law enforcement practice under the Fourth Amendment,” but noting that 
“our holding today [does not] cast doubt on the permissibility of . . . inspection checkpoints, at 
which some vehicles may be subject to further detention for safety and regulatory inspection than are 
others”); see also Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (restating the dicta in Prouse allowing checkpoint stops for 
discovery of unlicensed drivers or unregistered vehicles). 
 148. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444. 
 149. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000). Courts have drawn a distinction 
between general crime control roadblocks and drunk driving roadblocks because impaired driving 
presents an “immediate, vehicle bound threat to life and limb that the sobriety checkpoint . . . was 
designed to eliminate.” Id. at 43. 
[O]ur checkpoint cases have recognized only limited exceptions to the general rule that a 
seizure must be accompanied by some measure of individualized suspicion. . . . Because 
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Courts have approved checkpoint stops even when not all vehicles 
are stopped.150 A checkpoint stop need not include every vehicle when 
the decision regarding which vehicles to stop is not a matter of officer 
discretion but based on a stated plan to ensure the orderly flow of traffic 
and to prevent a safety hazard.151 
Some jurisdictions have specific checkpoint standards: the check-
point stop must be clearly marked; motorists must be given notice in ad-
vance of the checkpoint; and the standards governing whether to stop 
every motorist or every second, third, or so on motorist must be estab-
lished in advance to prevent the officers at the checkpoint from acting 
arbitrarily when selecting which motorists to check.152 The stop, general-
ly in a line of cars, must be very brief, just long enough to satisfy the val-
id public purpose justifying the checkpoint.153 If the checkpoint is to de-
                                                                                                                            
the primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evi-
dence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 41–42; see also Mills v. District of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (disallowing 
suspicionless roadblock stops that have as their primary purpose crime control); Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 722 N.E.2d 429 (Mass. 2000) (holding drug interdiction roadblock is illegal because it 
aims at criminal investigation, not immediate threat to public safety). But see Illinois v. Lidster, 540 
U.S. 419, 423 (2004) (upholding the constitutional reasonableness of a roadblock stop for infor-
mation at a location where a fatal hit-and-run accident had occurred one week before and where the 
driver was arrested for a DUI, even though “[t]he stop’s primary law enforcement purpose was not 
to determine whether a vehicle’s occupants were committing a crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, 
as members of the public, for their help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood 
committed by others”); id. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (acknowl-
edging a valid distinction between a roadblock instituted to determine whether a motorist is commit-
ting a crime and a roadblock instituted to solicit information about a crime that occurred a week 
earlier). 
 150. See United States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 561 (6th Cir. 1998) (remanding a denied 
motion to suppress evidence obtained at a highway checkpoint that was “set up as a trap” and was 
“more akin to a roving patrol stop than to a sobriety checkpoint . . . [because] the procedure did not 
treat motorists on a non-random basis, but singled out motorists”). 
 151. United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 
(1981). 
 152. State v. Goines, 474 N.E.2d 1219, 1221–22 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (“Where there is no 
consent, probable cause, or Terry-type reasonable and articulable suspicion, a vehicle stop may be 
made only where there minimally exists (1) a checkpoint or roadblock location selected for its safety 
and visibility to oncoming motorists; (2) adequate advance warning signs, illuminated at night, time-
ly informing approaching motorists of the nature of the impending intrusion; (3) uniformed officers 
and official vehicles in sufficient quantity and visibility to ‘show . . . the police power of the com-
munity;’ and (4) a predetermination by policy-making administrative officers of the roadblock loca-
tion, time, and procedures to be employed, pursuant to carefully formulated standards and neutral 
criteria.”). 
 153. See generally Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (finding that a brief delay of drivers at a sobriety check-
point lasting an average of twenty-five seconds and screening only for driving under the influence, is 
not unreasonable and thus does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment). But see id. at 458–59 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“That stopping every car might make it easier to prevent drunken driving . 
. . is an insufficient justification for abandoning the requirement of individualized suspicion. . . . 
Without proof that the police cannot develop individualized suspicion that a person is driving while 
impaired by alcohol, I believe the constitutional balance must be struck in favor of protecting the 
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tect drunk driving, an officer may shine a light on the driver as each car 
moves to the front of the line to determine whether there are visible signs 
of intoxication; alternatively, the officer may request the motorist to roll 
down his window to ascertain whether there is an odor of alcohol or an 
indication of intoxication that can be detected from the driver’s speech. 
The officer may use a portable device to measure the air quality within a 
few inches of the driver to ascertain alcohol content.154 Each interaction 
with a motorist in line must be extremely brief, no more than a minute or 
two at the most.155 
During that brief, cursory stop, if facts and circumstances give rise 
to a reasonable suspicion to believe that a motorist is driving without a 
valid license or that the motorist is impaired, the motorist may be pulled 
out of the line for further investigation.156 Once police divert a motorist 
from the regular flow of traffic past the checkpoint, the stop becomes an 
investigative stop of a single vehicle and driver for which particularized 
suspicion is required.157 
If the checkpoint stop is to detect drunk driving, reasonable suspi-
cion must develop during the checkpoint stop to order the motorist out of 
line for further inquiry.158 Field sobriety tests must be supported by facts 
and circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion to believe that 
                                                                                                                            
public against even the ‘minimally intrusive’ seizures involved in this case.”); see also People v. 
Burke, No. 08–406, 899 N.Y.S.2d 61, at *2 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. July 28, 2009) (holding that the court 
“has no issue with any officer utilizing a reasonably idiosyncratic version” of protocol for a sobriety 
checkpoint). 
 154. See Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 155. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984) (“[D]etention of a motorist 
pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside deten-
tions last only a few minutes.”). 
 156. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the Court that the initial stop 
of a car at a roadblock under the Michigan State Police sobriety checkpoint policy is sufficiently less 
intrusive than an arrest so that the reasonableness of the seizure may be judged, not by the presence 
of probable cause, but by balancing ‘the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the 
degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with 
individual liberty.’”); State v. Bauer, 651 N.E.2d 46, 47 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (reversing the trial 
court’s suppression of evidence, and finding that a police checkpoint met constitutional requirements 
under the Fourth Amendment when the Police Chief set the standard for stopping cars as follows: “A 
typical pattern . . . would involve stopping two vehicles, waving the next five through and then re-
peating the pattern, to give a random stop ratio of two cars in seven. As traffic volume decreased 
through the night, Chief McCoy . . . would increase the proportion of cars stopped”). 
 157. Bauer, 651 N.E.2d at 49 (“Detention of selected motorists for more extensive field sobrie-
ty testing continues to require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion under Terry v. Ohio and its 
progeny.”). 
 158. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 (determining that although police may set up roadblocks without any 
individual suspicion, “[d]etention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing 
may require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard”). 
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the motorist is impaired.159 Most American states do not make drinking 
and driving illegal160 unless the motorist is impaired.161 If the motorist 
dispels reasonable suspicion by passing the initial sobriety tests, the in-
vestigatory detention should end.162 However, the field sobriety testing, 
supported by reasonable suspicion, may give rise to probable cause to 
support an arrest of the motorist for drunk driving. Once police arrest a 
motorist on probable cause, the police can require a chemical test to de-
termine the level of alcohol or other drugs in the motorist’s body.163 
C. Custodial Arrest 
States that permit police to either ticket or arrest drivers for minor 
offenses create situations ripe for pretextual stops and arrests.164 Other 
than when the arrestable offense is unquestionably related to highway 
safety, such as driving without a license or with a suspended license, cus-
todial arrests for minor traffic offenses should have to be justified be-
yond the commission of the minor violation. A custodial arrest carries 
severe ramifications. 
If the motorist spends any time in a lockup following the arrest be-
fore release, that time spent is punishment that likely is not even availa-
ble as a penalty following conviction. Even if the statute carries a poten-
tial jail sentence, that sentence will likely be a fine and not confine-
ment.165 Any time in a lockup subjects the arrestee to some risk of assault 
or worse. Even if he or she is released immediately from the police sta-
                                                        
 159. Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Because of the signifi-
cant public interest in preventing a motorist whom an officer reasonably believes may be intoxicated 
from continuing to drive, and because further detention for a field sobriety test is a minimal intrusion 
on an already legally stopped individual’s privacy, however, many state courts have held that an 
officer may detain a motorist for such testing so long as there is reasonable suspicion that the driver 
may be intoxicated.”). 
 160. See, e.g., BARRY S. JACOBSON, UNDERSTANDING THE SCIENTIFIC STRENGTHS AND 
WEAKNESSES IN DWI SCIENCE AND APPLYING YOUR KNOWLEDGE TO THE CASE (Thomson Reu-
ters/Aspatore eds., 2010) (citing New York DWI law). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See generally United States v. Burton, 441 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2006) (“A ‘stop’ with-
out limiting the suspect’s freedom requires no suspicion; a brief detention calls for reasonable suspi-
cion; an arrest requires probable cause; invasive techniques such as surgery require more.”). 
 163. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966) (holding that because 
alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after a person stops drinking, the attempt to secure 
blood without a warrant was appropriate incident to the appellant’s arrest). 
 164. In general, New York law favors citations over arrests for traffic infractions. See, e.g., 
People v. Marsh, 228 N.E.2d 783, 785 (N.Y. 1967) (“[A] traffic infraction is not a crime” and N.Y. 
VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 207 “statutes authorize . . . [issuance of] a summons in lieu of arrest.” (con-
struing N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 155)); see also infra note 189. 
 165. Marsh, 228 N.E.2d at 785. 
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tion or jail, the arrest carries a degree of humiliation that may be indeli-
ble.166 
Custodial arrests for minor traffic offenses are problematic on sev-
eral levels. An arrest for a simple traffic violation signals that the police 
singled out the motorist for special treatment and attention. Why should 
one motorist not be stopped at all for the same offense; why should an-
other be stopped and given a traffic citation; and why should a third mo-
torist be arrested for the same offense? The disparate treatment, in many 
cases, is inexplicable, leading to conclusions unrelated to the seriousness 
of the motorist’s conduct. A custodial arrest for a minor traffic offense is 
an irrational and counterproductive employment of police resources. It 
takes the arresting officer off the street and away from traffic control for 
several hours while the arrestee is processed. Forty years ago, Justice 
Stewart suggested that “a persuasive claim might have been made . . . 
that the custodial arrest of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense vio-
lated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.”167 Long 
after Justice Stewart left, the Court unsatisfactorily resolved that issue in 
2001.168 
                                                        
 166. Sakura Mizuno, Justice Is Blind, Deaf, Dumb and Dumber, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 805, 824–
25 (2002) (“As a consequence, a detainee arrested for a minor offense may be confined with those 
accused of committing murder, rape, and other violent crimes, in addition to the mentally unstable 
and those with communicable disease such as AIDS, tuberculosis, and hepatitis. Further, conditions 
in jails are sometimes highly unsanitary. When taking into consideration all of the above-mentioned 
factors, it is highly possible for an arrestee charged with a minor offense to be assaulted or exposed 
to an infectious disease while confined in a jail cell. Furthermore, studies have shown the first twen-
ty-four hours in jail to be the most deadly. Many inmates arrive as a suicide risk, with the possibility 
of the suicide taking place within the first few hours of custody.”); see also Brief of the Inst. on 
Criminal Justice at the Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3–
6, Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (No. 99-1408), 2000 WL 1341293, at *4–8. 
 167. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1973); see also United States v. Ames, 94 F. 
App’x. 353, 354 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding the district court’s decision “that Indiana officers have 
the authority to make custodial arrests for minor traffic violations”); Brooks v. City of Seattle, 599 
F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2010) (ruling that the argument also failed in a case where the circuit court 
granted immunity to arresting officers in a 1983 action, finding tasing a pregnant woman three-times 
for her failure to sign a speeding ticket did not amount to excessive force). But see Brooks, 599 F.3d 
at 1032 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (“I fail utterly to comprehend how my colleagues are able to con-
clude that it was objectively reasonable to use any force against Brooks, let alone three activations of 
a Taser, in response to such a trivial offense.” (emphasis in original)); State v. Martin, 253 N.W.2d 
404, 406 (Minn. 1977) (“In other words, under the rules of the state constitution, an officer ordinari-
ly may not arrest a person without a warrant for a petty misdemeanor. Therefore, the arrest of de-
fendant for the petty misdemeanor offense of possessing a small amount of marijuana was illegal.”); 
State v. Hehman, 578 P.2d 527, 528 (Wash. 1978) (“We hold as a matter of public policy that custo-
dial arrest for minor traffic violations is unjustified, unwarranted, and impermissible if the defendant 
signs the promise to appear.”). 
 168. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
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In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,169 the Supreme Court rejected Jus-
tice Stewart’s view of the Fourth Amendment and held that a custodial 
arrest for an offense that carries only a fine does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. Mrs. Atwater was driving with her two young children in 
the front seat; neither Mrs. Atwater nor her children were wearing seat 
belts. Police stopped her and arrested her for the violation, which carried 
a maximum $50 fine. Texas law authorized arrest for such offenses, but 
also authorized police officers to issue citations for the offense in lieu of 
arrest. The officer approached the vehicle and yelled “something to the 
effect ‘[w]e’ve met before’ and ‘you’re going to jail.’”170 The officer had 
previously stopped Mrs. Atwater for a seatbelt violation but issued a 
warning when he observed that her child was wearing a seatbelt but was 
in an unsafe seating position.171 This time, when stopped, Mrs. Atwater 
did not have her driver’s license or insurance documentation with her. 
The officer charged her with driving without wearing a seatbelt, failing 
to have her children in seatbelts, driving without her license, and failing 
to provide proof of insurance. The officer handcuffed Mrs. Atwater, 
placed her in the police car, drove her to the police station,172 and booked 
her—compelling her to remove her shoes, jewelry, and eyeglasses, and 
empty her pockets.173 After placing her in a jail cell for an hour, police 
then took her to a magistrate where she posted bond. She pleaded no con-
test to the seatbelt offense and paid a fifty-dollar fine. The other charges 
were dismissed. Mrs. Atwater brought a § 1983 suit in a Texas state 
court claiming that the officer and the municipality violated her Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure.174 
The Supreme Court disparaged the officer’s decision to arrest Mrs. 
Atwater: “In her case, the physical incidents of arrest were merely gratui-
tous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercis-
ing extremely poor judgment.”175 With regard to justification for the ar-
rest in this case, the Court said, “Atwater’s claim to live free of pointless 
                                                        
 169. Id. But see State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 2004) (“Therefore, simply be-
cause Atwater has most likely foreclosed any Fourth Amendment protection for Askerooth, this does 
not mean that article I, section 10 [of the Minnesota State Constitution] does not afford him protec-
tion.”); see also State v. Bauer, 36 P.3d 892 (Mont. 2001); State v. Bayard, 71 P.3d 498 (Nev. 2003); 
State v. Brown, 792 N.E.2d 175 (Ohio 2003). 
 170. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324. 
 171. Id. at 324 n.1. 
 172. See id. at 324; see also id. at 368–69 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Only the intervention of 
neighborhood children who had witnessed the scene and summoned one of Atwater’s friends saved 
the children from being hauled to jail with their mother.”). 
 173. Id. at 354–55. 
 174. Id. at 324–25. 
 175. Id. at 346–47. 
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indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can raise 
against it specific to her case.”176 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that this stupid, unnecessary 
arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice Souter’s analysis 
was purely historical: he rejected the argument that, at common law, a 
warrantless arrest for a minor offense was limited to offenses that in-
volved or tended to violence. Justice Souter’s disappointing majority 
opinion focused only on the perceived original intent of the framers of 
the Constitution, and Professor Maclin claims it is poor history at that.177 
Justice Souter concluded that neither English law nor U.S. law at the 
time of the adoption of the Constitution prohibited custodial arrests for 
any offenses.178 The Court rejected the petitioner’s request to create a 
“modern arrest rule . . . forbidding custodial arrest, even upon probable 
cause, when conviction could not ultimately carry any jail time and when 
the government shows no compelling need for immediate detention.”179 
But Justice Souter, claiming the proposed rule was “not ultimately so 
                                                        
 176. Id. 
 177. Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth 
Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 951–52 (2002) (“Justice Souter’s initial 
reason for rejecting Atwater’s historical argument focused on the lack of unanimity among common-
law commentators and jurists regarding an officer’s warrantless misdemeanor arrest power. . . . To 
the extent that precedent matters, however, unanimity among common-law sources regarding the 
authority of a search or seizure privilege has never been an essential cornerstone for a successful 
Fourth Amendment argument.”); id. at 953–55 (“As noted, most modern Fourth Amendment dis-
putes do not have roots in the common law. For the few cases that do, Payton and Steagald indicate 
that litigants need not prove unanimity among common-law sources to prevail on their constitutional 
claims. Without acknowledging the change in direction it represents, Atwater marks a departure 
from these cases. The reasoning employed in Atwater signals that when a challenged police practice 
has roots in the common law, disagreement among common-law sources—though not necessarily 
fatal to a Fourth Amendment claim—certainly undermines the strength of an argument that a chal-
lenged police practice is constitutionally unreasonable. Although Justice Souter did not elaborate on 
the point, his reliance on the divergence among common-law scholars and jurists raises the question 
why unanimity, or even substantial agreement, among common-law sources matters when judging 
the legitimacy of a Fourth Amendment privilege. Generally speaking, disagreement among com-
mon-law scholars on the authority of a particular legal norm should be expected. Despite its con-
servative reputation, “at various periods in its history the common law has shown a great capacity 
for innovation, and some of the greatest common-law judges—Coke, Hale, and Mansfield in Britain, 
and Shaw in this country—are famous for the changes they brought about in the common law. Fur-
ther, if one accepts the view that common-law norms do not derive from merely ‘a few exceptional 
lawgivers (or one lawgiving generation), but [from] many generations of lawyers and judges,’ then 
divergence among common-law scholars on the strength of a particular legal claim may not be espe-
cially significant, or even relevant, when determining the meaning of the Constitution. Common-law 
rules, like constitutional principles, do evolve with time. More specifically, disagreement, or even 
unanimity, among common-law scholars is a curious criterion for defining the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
 178. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 332. 
 179. Id. at 346. Compare id., with Easton v. Hurita, 625 P.2d 1290, 1296 (Or. 1981) (“[P]olice 
officers only have authority to ‘place the individual in jail’ for a minor traffic offense when he can 
point to ‘specific articulable facts justifying his being lodged in jail.’” (quoting state statutes)). 
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simple”180 and could lead to complications, elected an outcome that di-
vorces a state’s decision to give an officer unlimited discretion to make a 
custodial arrest, even when it is unjustifiable as in Atwater, from the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness command and analysis. Instead, the 
Court adopted a bright-line rule: “If an officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal of-
fense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, 
arrest the offender.”181 
Although the Supreme Court decided to allow police to make war-
rantless arrests for minor offenses, the opposite rule would protect citi-
zens from petty indignities and uneven enforcement of the law, valued 
principles in a free society. Requiring an officer to justify a custodial ar-
rest for a minor, trivial offense is consistent with our Fourth Amendment 
values. Applying the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness 
would not always be simple, and it would be fact-specific. Courts use 
reasonableness standards every day in all sorts of civil and criminal law 
cases, not just in Fourth Amendment contexts, and those courts do not 
throw their hands up in the air. The Supreme Court’s rejection of fact-
specific adjudication of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, in 
favor of bright-line rules, creates an artifice that inevitably favors police 
discretion at the expense of a citizen’s right to be left alone or to be treat-
ed reasonably and with common sense. Worse, the Court failed to ex-
plain why such an arrest fell within with the reasonableness command of 
the Fourth Amendment, leaving at best an eighteenth-century view of the 
issue irretrievably locked in place. 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the four dissenting justices, argued 
that “[w]hen a full custodial arrest is effected without a warrant, the plain 
language of the Fourth Amendment requires that the arrest be reasona-
ble.”182 In determining reasonableness, she said, “[E]ach case is to be 
decided on its own facts and circumstances.”183 The rule adopted by the 
majority, Justice O’Connor said, “is not only unsupported by our prece-
dent, but runs contrary to the principles that lie at the core of the Fourth 
Amendment.”184 She wrote: 
I cannot concur in a rule which deems a full custodial arrest to be 
reasonable in every circumstance. Giving police officers constitu-
tional carte blanche to effect an arrest whenever there is probable 
                                                        
 180. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 348. 
 181. Id. at 354. 
 182. Id. at 360–61 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 183. Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 184. Id. at 365–66 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)) 
(alteration in original). 
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cause to believe a fine-only misdemeanor has been committed is ir-
reconcilable with the Fourth Amendment’s command that seizures 
be reasonable. Instead, I would require that when there is probable 
cause to believe that a fine-only offense has been committed, the 
police officer should issue a citation unless the officer is “able to 
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with ra-
tional inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the addition-
al] intrusion” of a full custodial arrest.185 
Justice O’Connor got it right. The operation of the bright-line rule 
enshrines police discretion and beggars uneven enforcement. The exist-
ence of a statute authorizing the arrest should be the first step in the in-
quiry, not the only step. Fourth Amendment reasonableness requires that 
the state justify placing a simple traffic offender under custodial arrest 
and demonstrate that the arrest was not a ploy to expand an investigation 
and search a motorist. The Atwater decision was wrong and the Court 
should correct it. It is immaterial to this inquiry whether or not in 1791 
government officials could arrest for every offense committed in their 
presence without a public breach of the peace. Post-colonial society did 
not envision millions of traffic offenses each year. Absent specific justi-
fication, a custodial arrest for such an offense should be unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. The Atwater rule leaves too much room 
for unsupervised police discretion. 
Even in its current form, Atwater does not limit states,186 although 
many states prohibit custodial arrests for minor traffic offenses.187 New 
                                                        
 185. Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 186. Adam J. Breeden, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista: How Should States Respond to the Su-
preme Court’s Latest Expansion of Automobile Search & Seizure Law?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1395, 
1407–08 (2002) (“Atwater’s arrest was only allowed to take place because Texas state law allowed 
for it. By declining to adopt the per se rule put forth by Atwater, the Court preserved the states’ 
rights to govern their own police and arrest procedures. Under the majority decision, states will still 
be free to alter their own state laws.”). 
 187. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 810.410 (2011) (authorizing police to arrest or issue a citation 
for commission of a traffic crime, but directing officers not to make an arrest for a traffic violation); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2 (2011) (stating arrests may not be made “[f]or a public offense, 
other than a petty offense, committed or attempted in [the officer’s] presence”); see also State v. 
Ludemann, 778 N.W.2d 618 (S.D. 2010) (describing petty offenses as those with no risk of jail time, 
a relatively insignificant fine, and no right to a jury trial); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2401 (West 2010) 
(authorizing police officers to make warrantless arrests for “[a]ny crime, except a traffic infraction or 
a cigarette or tobacco infraction” committed in the officer’s view); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
431.015(2) (West 2011) (allowing officers to issue a citation instead of making an arrest for a viola-
tion committed in his presence rather than making a custodial arrest unless there are reasonable 
grounds to believe offender will not appear at the designated time, or if one of enumerated specific 
violations are charged); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.26 (West 2011) (prohibits arrests for minor 
misdemeanors in favor of a citation, except when defendant cannot properly care for himself, fails to 
offer appropriate identification, refuses to sign the citation, has a warrant out for a similar offense, or 
escalates criminal conduct by resisting following officer’s warnings and raising offense to a fourth-
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York law favors citations over arrests for traffic infractions.188 Similarly, 
an Ohio statute prohibits arrests for minor misdemeanors except for spec-
ified exceptions.189 The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that “the Ohio Consti-
tution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution against warrantless arrests for minor misde-
meanors.”190 
Some states statutorily authorize arrests but impose a general rule 
that arrestees be given a citation or summons to appear in court.191 How-
ever, in Virginia v. Moore, the Court held that an illegal arrest under state 
law, where probable cause exists, does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment and that evidence seized as a result of an illegal arrest under state 
law need not be suppressed.192 Moore differed from Atwater because 
Virginia, unlike Texas in the earlier case, prohibited custodial arrests for 
traffic offenses. The Virginia Supreme Court thought that difference was 
essential and ruled that the search incident to the illegal custodial arrest 
for driving under a suspended license violated the Fourth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court dismissed that distinction and held that, under the 
Fourth Amendment, it would not enforce the stricter state rule. 
D. Search of Motorist Incident to a Custodial Arrest 
A custodial arrest of a motorist for a traffic law violation raises ex-
ponentially different issues than the intrusion following a traffic citation 
                                                                                                                            
degree misdemeanor); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-7-3 (West 2010) (authorizing warrantless arrest 
for misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that person 
cannot be arrested later or may cause injury to himself or herself or others or loss or damage to prop-
erty unless immediately arrested). 
 188. See supra note 164. 
 189. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.26 (West 2011) (prohibiting arrests for minor misdemean-
ors in favor of a citation, except when defendant cannot properly care for himself, fails to offer ap-
propriate identification, refuses to sign the citation, has a warrant out for a similar offense, or esca-
lates criminal conduct by resisting following officer’s warnings and raising offense to a fourth-
degree misdemeanor). 
 190. State v. Brown, 792 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ohio 2003). 
 191. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2 (2011) (stating arrests may not be made “[f]or a public 
offense, other than a petty offense, committed or attempted in [the officer’s] presence”); State v. 
Ludemann, 778 N.W.2d 618 (S.D. 2010) (describing petty offenses as those with no risk of jail time, 
a relatively insignificant fine, and no right to a jury trial); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-118 (2)(B) 
(West 2000) (directing officers to write a citation in lieu of arrest for any misdemeanor offense that 
does not require the offender to go before a judge or magistrate); see also People v. Watkins, 166 
N.E.2d 433, 437 (Ill. 1960) (“A uniform rule permitting a search in every case of a valid arrest, even 
for minor traffic violations, would greatly simplify our task and that of law enforcement officers. But 
such an approach would preclude consideration of the reasonableness of any particular search, and 
so would take away the protection that the constitution is designed to provide. Other courts are in 
accord. They have refused to establish a uniform rule to govern all searches accompanying valid 
arrests, but rather have examined the nature of the offense and the surrounding circumstances to 
determine whether the search was warranted.”). 
 192. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008). 
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issued to a motorist. Police may not search a motorist incident to issu-
ance of a traffic citation.193 Even if the offense could result in a custodial 
arrest, once a police officer decides to issue a citation instead of making 
an arrest, no search is permissible.194 Ordinarily, police briefly detain the 
motorist, and the motorist may leave immediately after receiving the 
ticket, absent facts and circumstances giving rise to a reasonable belief 
that the motorist is armed or dangerous that would justify a pat down 
search of outer clothing for weapons.195 However, police may subject 
every arrested motorist to a full search of the person,196 even if the under-
lying reasons justifying warrantless searches incident to arrest, protecting 
the arresting officer and preventing the arrestee from destroying evi-
dence,197 do not exist following a custodial traffic offense. There is no 
evidence of a traffic offense to be destroyed, and a pat down of the ar-
restee’s outer clothing for weapons would provide adequate protection 
for the police officer. 
The real world application of the search incident to arrest can be 
seen in United States v. Robinson, in which police arrested the defendant 
for driving following revocation of his license.198 The arresting officer, 
who knew the defendant from a prior encounter, did not indicate any 
subjective fear of the defendant, nor suspect that the suspect was 
armed.199 District of Columbia police rules required a custodial arrest for 
the offense and a full search of an arrestee prior to entering the squad 
car.200 Pursuant to those written police procedures, the officer did a full 
                                                        
 193. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998). 
 194. Id. at 114 (“An Iowa police officer stopped petitioner Knowles for speeding, but issued 
him a citation rather than arresting him. The question presented is whether such a procedure author-
izes the officer, consistently with the Fourth Amendment, to conduct a full search of the car. We 
answer this question ‘no.’”). 
 195. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) (a 
passenger in a legally stopped vehicle may be frisked if there is reasonable suspicion that the pas-
senger is armed or dangerous); United States v. Jackson, No. CR406-258, 2006 WL 3479063, at *3 
(S.D. Ga. Nov. 30, 2006) (“Whenever an individual has been lawfully seized by the police . . . for 
purposes of a traffic stop, he may be subjected to a frisk where officers reasonably believe that he 
poses a danger to the officers or others nearby.” (citations omitted)). 
 196. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (“[I]t is the fact of custodial arrest 
which gives rise to the authority to search . . . .”). 
 197. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (“When an arrest is made, it is reason-
able for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the 
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety 
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the 
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its 
concealment or destruction.”), abrogated on other grounds by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), 
as recognized in Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 198. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236. 
 199. Id. at 220, 236. 
 200. Id. at 221 n.2. 
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field-type search including an examination of the contents of all pock-
ets.201 The officer retrieved a crumpled cigarette package from the de-
fendant’s shirt pocket.202 Once the officer had the cigarette package, 
there was no longer any remote danger that the defendant could retrieve 
the package and threaten the officer with a small weapon that might be 
hidden in the package or destroy evidence that might be hidden in the 
crumpled packet.203 The officer opened the pack and found gelatin cap-
sules containing heroin.204 The Supreme Court held, as a bright-line rule, 
that police may conduct a full search of an arrestee’s person incident to 
any lawful custodial arrest.205 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said “[a] custodial arrest 
of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the 
Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the 
arrest requires no additional justification.”206 The authority to conduct the 
warrantless search flows automatically from a lawful custodial arrest; no 
individualized justification is required for the search. Evidence of other 
crimes found during the search incident to arrest is admissible.207 
The Robinson rule is alternatively justifiable because the arrestee 
will be transported in the squad car to the police station, and the arrestee 
may gain access to the weapon or evidence on his person, however un-
likely, while riding in the police car. Some Supreme Court Justices have 
also rationalized the search on the theory that an arrestee no longer has a 
protected privacy interest in his person following the arrest.208 
                                                        
 201. Id. at 221–22. 
 202. Id. at 223. 
 203. Id. at 256 (Marshall, J. dissenting). 
 204. Id. at 223. 
 205. Id. at 235. 
 206. Id.; see also id. at 259 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The search conducted by Officer Jenks 
in this case went far beyond what was reasonably necessary to protect him from harm or to ensure 
that respondent would not effect an escape from custody. In my view, it therefore fell outside the 
scope of a properly drawn ‘search incident to arrest’ exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement.”). 
 207. Id. at 233–34. 
 208. Id. at 236–37 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The Fourth Amendment safeguards the right of 
‘the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. . . .’ These are areas of an individual’s life about which he entertains legitimate expec-
tations of privacy. I believe that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no 
significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person. Under this view, the custodial 
arrest is the significant intrusion of state power into the privacy of one’s person. If the arrest is law-
ful, the privacy interest guarded by the Fourth Amendment is subordinated to a legitimate and over-
riding governmental concern. No reason then exists to frustrate law enforcement by requiring some 
independent justification for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. This seems to me the 
reason that a valid arrest justifies a full search of the person, even if that search is not narrowly lim-
ited by the twin rationales of seizing evidence and disarming the arrestee.”); see also Thornton v. 
United States, 541 U.S. 615, 633 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he lawful custodial arrest 
justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.”). 
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The problem with the bright-line rule established in Robinson arose 
in its companion case, Gustafson v. State,209 where local police arrested 
the defendant for not having his driver’s license on his person. While 
local police procedure required the officer in Robinson to make a custo-
dial arrest for the offense, the officer in Gustafson had discretion to arrest 
or issue a traffic ticket.210 The Supreme Court majority did not find these 
differences “determinative of the constitutional issue” and failed to ad-
dress the issue of discretion.211 Incident to the arrest, the officer searched 
the defendant at the scene and removed a box of Benson and Hedges 
from the arrestee’s pocket. After the officer placed the motorist into the 
police car, he opened the box of cigarettes and found hand-rolled mariju-
ana cigarettes. The decision to make an arrest for the driving offense was 
in the officer’s discretion, creating a double dose of discretion, since the 
officer decides both whom to stop and whom to arrest. That discretion 
could play out in several ways: How does the officer exercise that discre-
tion? Does he decide to make a custodial arrest before he confronts the 
motorist, or does the decision on custody depend on what turns up during 
the search? If the latter, then the arrest really becomes incident to the 
search rather than a search incident to an arrest, which is not only consti-
tutionally flawed but also problematic for a society based on the rule of 
law.212 
                                                        
 209. Gustafson v. State, 243 So. 2d 615, 619 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971). 
 210. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 n.3 (stating in majority opinion that officer testi-
fied he takes three or four out of ten stopped for the offense into custody); see also Gustafson, 243 
So. 2d at 619 (“Section 186.51(1) of the Model Traffic Ordinance adopted by the City of Eau Gallie 
provides that a violator of a traffic ordinance may be kept in custody or released on bail where it 
appears doubtful that he will appear pursuant to a written citation.” (emphasis added)). 
 211. Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 265 (“Though the officer here was not required to take the peti-
tioner into custody by police regulations as he was in Robinson, and there did not exist a depart-
mental policy establishing the conditions under which a full-scale body search should be conducted, 
we do not find these differences determinative of the constitutional issue.”); see also United States v. 
Garcia, 376 F.3d 648, 650 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Garcia was not among those covered by a catch-and-
release regimen, however. He could not produce a driver’s license, and Gustafson holds that a driver 
who lacks a license is subject to full custodial arrest and thorough search.”). But see State v. Ladson, 
979 P.2d 833, 840 (Wash. 1999) (“But in State v. Hehman, our first postincorporation divergence 
from federal precedent, we rejected Robinson and Gustafson and the Supreme Court’s abandonment 
of the no-pretext rule. In Hehman the issue was whether a search incident-to-an-arrest for a minor 
traffic stop was valid. Hehman not only rejected the recent federal cases but reaffirmed the pretext 
rule in Washington and further held under state public policy minor traffic stops could not support an 
arrest at all because the risk of pretext arrests is heightened.” (citations omitted)); Brooks Holland, 
Safeguarding Equal Protection Rights: The Search for an Exclusionary Rule Under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1107, 1107 (2000) (“In perhaps no setting does law enforce-
ment possess greater discretion than in the decision to conduct a traffic stop . . . .”). 
 212. Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and 
Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1416 (2000) (“The Fourth Amend-
ment’s historical background clearly demonstrates a fear of the discretion of the official in the field, 
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E. Expanding a Traffic Stop: Inquiries into Other Crimes, Canine Sniff, 
Consensual Searches 
1. Inquiries About Unrelated Crimes 
A motorist lawfully stopped for a traffic violation can become the 
target of police inquiry about unrelated, more serious crimes.213 During a 
lawful traffic stop, police may ask the motorist about unrelated crimes 
without later having to justify their questions. The motorist’s automobile 
may be the object of a police drug dog’s attention without any reason to 
believe that the particular motorist is involved in drug use or trafficking. 
The decisions to ask about other crimes or to run the drug dog around the 
car are completely within the police officer’s discretion, not subject to 
later reasonableness review under the Fourth Amendment, even if these 
inquiries result in non-traffic related criminal charges. 
In a free society, it would be reasonable to expect that a police stop 
of a motorist for a noncustodial arrest traffic offense would be brief and 
limited to issuance of the ticket or warning once it is established that the 
motorist has a valid driver’s license and the car is properly registered. 
Even though the officer has probable cause or reasonable suspicion to 
believe the motorist has committed a minor traffic offense, the ramifica-
tions of such a stop are, and should be, very different from those associ-
ated with a custodial arrest for a more serious criminal offense. The mo-
torist may not be searched as a matter of routine incident to the traffic 
stop,214 nor should the car be searched absent the motorist’s consent or 
the car’s lawful impoundment and inventory.215 That is exactly how a 
                                                                                                                            
at that time embodied in general warrants that empowered an officer to search wherever he chose for 
evidence of a crime.”). 
 213. Compare Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (“And there is no question that, in light 
of the admitted probable cause to stop Robinette for speeding, Deputy Newsome was objectively 
justified in asking Robinette to get out of the car, subjective thoughts notwithstanding.”), with Peo-
ple v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556 (Ill. 1999) (“Certainly Robinette does not stand for the proposition 
that, following the conclusion of a lawful traffic stop, officers may detain a vehicle without reasona-
ble suspicion of any illegal activity and for any amount of time, so long as they ultimately request 
and obtain permission to search the car.”). 
 214. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 114 (1998) (“An Iowa police officer stopped petitioner 
Knowles for speeding, but issued him a citation rather than arresting him. The question presented is 
whether such a procedure authorizes the officer, consistently with the Fourth Amendment, to con-
duct a full search of the car. We answer this question ‘no.’”). 
 215. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987) (“We conclude that here, as in Lafa-
yette, reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satis-
fy the Fourth Amendment, even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equal-
ly reasonable rules requiring a different procedure.”); United States v. Hughes, 420 F. App’x 533, 
541 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Because police had probable cause to arrest Hughes for driving under suspen-
sion, and did effect an arrest for that offense; and because they conducted an inventory search in 
accordance with the standardized tow policy of the Cleveland police department, the requirements of 
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traffic stop plays out when most of us are stopped for committing minor 
traffic offenses. We are issued the ticket, as well as a summons to appear 
in court, and we are then permitted to drive off, grumbling about our 
poor luck. Some motorists have much worse luck. 
However, the Fourth Amendment does not dictate the speediest and 
simplest intrusion, and some persons stopped for such offenses may end 
up feeling like a public enemy. The police officer may order the motorist 
to remain in her vehicle or may order the motorist out of her vehicle. The 
law considers that decision totally within the police officer’s discretion: a 
“minor intrusion” premised upon ensuring the safety of the officer, a de-
cision an officer never needs to justify.216 If the officer sees a firearm in 
plain view in the car during the lawful traffic stop, the officer may seize 
it during the traffic stop even if it is lawfully carried. 217 The officer may 
not order the motorist to sit in the squad car simply for the officer’s con-
venience while processing the ticket. A safety rationale must exist to un-
derlie the order to sit in the police car. Most jurisdictions allow a pat 
down of the motorist’s outer clothing for weapons before placing the mo-
torist in the police car to ensure officer safety.218 It is the pat down that 
escalates the stop from a minor traffic offense and reintroduces the 
Fourth Amendment to the equation. 
Some jurisdictions analogize a traffic stop for a minor traffic of-
fense, even if based upon probable cause, to a temporary seizure allowed 
under Terry v. Ohio219 to investigate possible criminal activity. The theo-
                                                                                                                            
the Fourth Amendment are satisfied.”); People v. Nash, 947 N.E.2d 350 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (holding 
that a search after a lawful impound does not require a warrant). 
 216. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (extending the ability to pull occupant 
out of a car if he suspects the presence of a weapon because the Court has “specifically recognized 
the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile”); Mary-
land v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1997) (“[D]anger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to 
be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car. While there is not 
the same basis for ordering the passengers out of the car as there is for ordering the driver out, the 
additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal. We therefore hold that an officer making a traffic 
stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop.”). 
 217. See, e.g., Megesi v. State, 627 S.E.2d 814, 818 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (“Therefore, we hold 
that when an officer is informed during a traffic stop that a weapon, licensed or otherwise, is in the 
vehicle, the officer may secure the weapon for his protection.”); State v. Wilson, No. 41333-3-I, 
1998 WL 847110, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 1998) (“A legally possessed weapon represents just 
as great a danger to his safety as an illegal one.”). But see State v. Ketelson, 257 P.3d 957, 959 
(N.M. 2011) (determining that retrieving a gun from a convicted felon during a traffic stop is valid 
for the officer’s safety). 
 218. United States v. Smith, 322 F. App’x. 876, 877 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The Fourth Amend-
ment permitted the officers to search Smith and his car to look for weapons that could be used to 
injure police officers and to collect and preserve evidence.”). 
 219. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); cf. United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 506 
(4th Cir. 2011) (“Because a traffic stop is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custo-
dial arrest, we treat a traffic stop, whether based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion, under 
the standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio . . . . Pursuant to Terry, we analyze the propriety of a traffic 
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ry is that a traffic violation, even one based upon probable cause, is so 
qualitatively different from an arrest for a more serious offense that it 
should be treated more like a Terry stop. Terry requires the shortest and 
least intrusive means to confirm or dispel the suspicious activity; a traffic 
stop should not expose the motorist to more serious interference than a 
Terry stop allows when there is reasonable suspicion of a more serious 
criminal offense. In those states, the officer may focus only on the legit-
imate reason for the stop and not expand the inquiry to more serious 
crimes absent the emergence of reasonable suspicion to believe that other 
crimes merit inquiry and action. Thus, a stop for a minor traffic offense 
cannot be expanded beyond the issuance of a traffic ticket without addi-
tional cause giving rise to reasonable suspicion to justify the greater in-
trusion.220 
However, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment 
is not so limiting and does not restrict the subjects that a police officer 
may discuss with a motorist lawfully stopped for a traffic violation. The 
Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment allows police to engage 
in a fishing expedition for other crimes.221 The officer may ask the mo-
torist about other more serious offenses without greater cause that always 
would justify additional inquiries.222 Even the shortest allowed traffic 
stop provides enough time to ask about unrelated crimes. 
In Arizona v. Johnson, the Court reaffirmed that an expanded in-
quiry of a lawfully stopped motorist about other crimes does not violate 
                                                                                                                            
stop on two fronts. First, we analyze whether the police officer’s action was justified at its inception. 
Second, we analyze whether the police officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope 
to the circumstances that justified the stop.” (citations omitted)). 
 220. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 588 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[O]nce the purpose 
of the traffic stop is completed, a motorist cannot be further detained unless something that occurred 
during the stop caused the officer to have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity 
was afoot.”); Whitehead v. State, 698 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (“We think it 
would be a mistake to read Whren as allowing law enforcement officers to detain on the pretext of 
issuing a traffic citation or warning, and then deliberately to engage in activities not related to the 
enforcement of the traffic code in order to determine whether there are sufficient indicia of some 
illegal activity. Stopping a car for speeding does not confer the right to abandon or never begin to 
take action related to the traffic laws and, instead, to attempt to secure a waiver of Fourth Amend-
ment rights from a citizen whose only offense to that point is to have been selected from among 
many who have been detected violating a traffic regulation. An interpretation of Whren that is con-
sistent with Snow and Munafo requires the police to issue the citation or warning efficiently and 
expeditiously with a minimum of intrusion, only that which is required to carry forth the legitimate, 
although pretextual, purpose for the stop. We are condemning not the stop itself, but the detention 
after the pretextual stop that was for the purpose of determining whether the trooper could acquire 
sufficient probable cause or a waiver that would permit him to search the car for illegal narcotics.”); 
State v. Pearson, 251 P.3d 152 (Mont. 2011) (holding that reasonable suspicion of drug activity 
allowed the officer to expand the scope of the traffic stop when officer found that the defendant has a 
history with drugs and observed the defendant acting nervously and gripping a wad of money). 
 221. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009). 
 222. See infra text accompanying note 273. 
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the Fourth Amendment. In Johnson, an Arizona gangs task force pulled 
over an automobile after a license plate check revealed an insurance-
related suspension on the vehicle’s registration, a civil infraction war-
ranting only a citation.223 Three officers approached the vehicle and be-
gan asking Johnson, a passenger, about his clothing with gang-associated 
colors, a matter obviously unrelated to the traffic stop. The number of 
officers, at the outset, indicates that the stop was pretextual, an excuse to 
question the motorist about other matters, not an effort to address a traf-
fic infraction. The Court condoned the officer’s behavior: 
An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for 
the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the en-
counter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those 
inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.224 
Even Ohio, which championed limiting the scope of a traffic stop to 
the original offense, took note of the Supreme Court’s disapproving atti-
tude on this issue and relented, allowing an officer during a traffic stop to 
ask the motorist if she has guns or drugs in the car.225 Federal courts, pri-
or to Johnson, were divided as to whether questions unrelated to the pur-
pose of the stop required reasonable suspicion.226 
The only limitation, imposed half-heartedly and as a matter of rote 
by the Supreme Court, is that the extended inquiry may not unreasonably 
extend the duration of the traffic stop.227 The detention, solely for the 
                                                        
 223. Johnson, 555 U.S. at 327. 
 224. Id. at 333. 
 225. State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762, 768 (Ohio 1997) (“Officer Newsome was justified in 
briefly detaining Robinette in order to ask him whether he was carrying any illegal drugs or weapons 
pursuant to the drug interdiction policy, because such a policy promotes the public interest in quell-
ing the drug trade.”). 
 226. Compare United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001), modified by United States 
v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 2007), with United States v. Mendez, 467 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 
2006), withdrawn and superseded by 476 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding one officer’s question-
ing of defendant while another ran check of defendant’s identification did not extend duration of 
lawful traffic stop, and therefore, expanded questioning need not have been supported by separate 
reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Valenzuela, 494 F.3d 886 (10th Cir. 2007) (police 
officer, before writing up traffic ticket, asked motorist whether he had any weapons or other illegal 
items in the car). States agree that an officer can ask unrelated questions as long as they do not pro-
long the stop. See, e.g., Arroyo v. State, 711 S.E.2d 60, 63 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Hogan, 252 
P.3d 627, 636 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Schroeder, 330 S.W.3d 468, 474 (Mo. 2011); State v. 
Leyva, 250 P.3d 861, 868 (N.M. 2011); State v. Provet, 706 S.E.2d 513, 516 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011); 
Branch v. State, 335 S.W.3d 893, 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 
 227. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 2007) (ruling police did not 
violate motorist’s Fourth Amendment rights by asking him during a traffic stop if there were any 
weapons or contraband in his vehicle, providing the questioning does not overly prolong the stop); 
United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversing panel holding that questioning dur-
ing a traffic stop is unrelated to the purpose of the stop). 
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traffic stop, transforms into an illegal seizure if it is unreasonably long.228 
The Court has not determined how long a traffic stop may last before it 
becomes an unreasonable detention. Terry envisioned a brief stop, allow-
ing police to freeze the situation, lasting only a few moments while po-
lice confirm or dispel suspicious circumstances.229 The Supreme Court 
addressed the length of a Terry stop in United States v. Sharpe,230 where 
the detention on a back road lasted for twenty minutes. In an opinion by 
Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that a twenty-minute detention 
based on reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity is not 
unreasonable where the amount of time is reasonably needed to achieve 
the purpose of the stop, and where police diligently pursue a means of 
investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their suspicion quickly. 
Some state courts have held that processing an ordinary traffic stop 
should last only about fifteen minutes,231 which is probably the short end 
of that duration; other courts have indicated that a detention of twenty to 
twenty-five minutes during a traffic stop is reasonable.232 One federal 
court held that even a short, ten-minute stop to issue a warning was un-
reasonable where the officer “failed to diligently pursue the purposes of 
the stop and embarked on a sustained course of investigation into the 
presence of drugs in the car that constituted the bulk of the encounter” 
between the officer and the defendant.233 If the inquiries about unrelated 
                                                        
 228. Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333. 
 229. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 230. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985). 
 231. See State v. Brown, 916 N.E.2d 1138, 1143 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (“Here, Gazarek did not 
initiate the checks on the driver or appellant until five to ten minutes after the stop. A review of this 
court’s prior cases indicates that an officer should, on average, have completed the necessary checks 
and be ready to issue a traffic citation in approximately 15 minutes. We are convinced that by im-
permissibly questioning both the driver and appellant, the length of the stop was prolonged. We find 
that the tactics used in this case impermissibly expanded the length and the scope of the investigative 
stop and violated the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 14, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution.” (citations omitted)). But see United States v. Aispuro-Medina, 
256 F. App’x. 215 (10th Cir. 2007) (calling to Immigration and Customs Enforcement did not im-
permissibly extend the traffic stop); United States v. Long, 532 F.3d 791, 795 (8th Cir. 2008) (“A 
stop may be extended for a length of time sufficient to enable the apprehending officer to ask the 
driver to step out of the vehicle or wait in the patrol car, to ask about the motorist’s destination and 
purpose, to check the validity of the driver’s license and registration, and to check the driver’s crimi-
nal history for outstanding warrants.”); State v. Jenkins, 3 A.3d 806, 829 (Conn. 2010) 
(“[R]easonableness is not measured solely by the temporal duration of the stop alone but, rather, 
requires scrupulous consideration of the reasonableness of the officers’ actions during the time of the 
stop.”). 
 232. See, e.g., United States v. Kitchell, 653 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding 22 minute 
traffic stop not unreasonable); United States v. Geboyan, 367 F. App’x. 99 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding 
20 minute traffic stop reasonable); Ward v. Commonwealth, 345 S.W.3d 249 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011) 
(holding 15–20 minute traffic stop not unreasonable). 
 233. United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 511 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he government’s 
argument fails to recognize that investigative stops must be limited both in scope and duration. Cre-
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matters extend the stop beyond the ordinary time it takes to process a 
traffic ticket, the stop transforms into an illegal seizure of the motorist 
unless there are facts and circumstances giving rise to reasonable suspi-
cion to support the additional inquiries.234 
Police discretion in choosing which stopped cars to target remains 
an issue that has not been subject to the scrutiny it merits. Targeting 
young black males as well as young men in old, run-down cars raises the 
same specter of racial profiling that runs through any discussion of traffic 
stops.235 Moreover, the emphasis on run-down cars also signals the dis-
proportionate impact upon the poor in our society.236 Limiting Fourth 
Amendment review only to the objective reason for the stop and the du-
ration of the stop neglects enormous, unchecked and unreviewed discre-
tion vested in police to determine which traffic offenders they stop and 
subject to enhanced scrutiny.237 
2. Canine Sniff of Stopped Car 
In Illinois v. Caballes,238 the Supreme Court held that using a drug 
sniffing dog to inspect a car stopped for a traffic violation did not intrude 
                                                                                                                            
ating a rule that allows a police officer fifteen minutes to do as he pleases reduces the duration com-
ponent to a bright-line rule and eliminates the scope inquiry altogether. In its reasonableness juris-
prudence, the Supreme Court has ‘consistently eschewed bright-line rules,’ and the scope of a police 
officer’s actions remains relevant in the Fourth Amendment traffic stop inquiry.” (emphasis in origi-
nal)). 
 234. See United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Once the purposes of the 
initial traffic stop were completed, there is no doubt that the officer could not further detain the 
vehicle or its occupants unless something that occurred during the traffic stop generated the neces-
sary reasonable suspicion to justify a further detention.”); United States v. Briasco, 640 F.3d 857, 
860 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that objective factors—sagging rear of the car, nervous driver, and 
vague details of cross-country travel plans—led to a reasonable suspicion that the defendants were 
transporting marijuana); State v. Batchili, 865 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Ohio 2007) (“Moreover, assum-
ing the detention was actually prolonged by the request for a dog search, ‘the detention of a stopped 
driver may continue beyond [the normal] time frame when additional facts are encountered that give 
rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity beyond that which prompted the initial 
stop.’”). 
 235. Kathleen M. O’Day, Pretextual Traffic Stops: Protecting Our Streets or Racist Police 
Tactics?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313 (stating that police officer in United States v. Harvey admitted 
that he targeted old cars driven by black men when trying to locate drug dealers (citing United States 
v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109 (6th Cir. 1994)). 
 236. Cf. Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing 
Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1403, 1474 (2010) (“[A study of New York City stops and frisks by police] found that poor persons 
of color were more likely than white individuals to be stopped, searched, questioned, and arrested by 
police.” (citation omitted)). 
 237. See, e.g., United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The 
citing of an area as ‘high-crime’ requires careful examination by the court, because such a descrip-
tion, unless properly limited and factually based, can easily serve as a proxy for race or ethnicity.”). 
 238. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
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upon “legitimate privacy interests” since the traffic stop was lawful.239 
Any lawfully stopped vehicle may be subjected to inspection by a drug 
dog. The keys are the lawfulness and the duration of the stop.240 The rule 
also extends to cars not stopped by the police but legally parked or 
stopped at traffic lights.241 
The Caballes majority relied entirely upon United States v. 
Place.242 In Place, the Supreme Court pronounced in dicta that a dog 
sniff in a public place alerting police to the presence of drugs does not 
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.243 Consequently, the 
prosecution need not establish reasonableness for the decision to use a 
drug dog on a particular car. Justice O’Connor, who wrote the majority 
opinion in Place, went beyond the issues necessary to decide the case—
the length of time that police seized the suitcase—unilaterally issuing a 
general approval of the use of drug dogs to sniff out contraband.244 The 
Court anchored Place to three general assumptions: (1) that a dog sniff is 
a minor intrusion; (2) that a dog sniff discloses no other fact than wheth-
                                                        
 239. Id. at 409. 
 240. United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Such a dog sniff may 
be the product of an unconstitutional seizure, however, if the traffic stop is unreasonably prolonged 
before the dog is employed. Once an officer has decided to permit a routine traffic offender to depart 
with a ticket, a warning, or an all clear, the Fourth Amendment applies to limit any subsequent de-
tention or search. We recognize, however, that this dividing line is artificial and that dog sniffs that 
occur within a short time following the completion of a traffic stop are not constitutionally prohibit-
ed if they constitute only de minimis intrusions on the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.” (cita-
tions omitted)). 
 241. Hill v. Sharber, 544 F. Supp. 2d 670, 679 (D. Tenn. 2008) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit has held 
that law enforcement officers may sweep a parking lot with drug dogs without implicating the 
Fourth Amendment, as individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a parking lot 
that is accessible to the public.”); see also United States v. Gooch, 499 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2007). But 
see Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[A]n uncritical adherence to Place would 
render the Fourth Amendment indifferent to suspicionless and indiscriminate sweeps of cars in park-
ing garages and pedestrians on sidewalks; if a sniff is not preceded by a seizure subject to Fourth 
Amendment notice, it escapes Fourth Amendment review entirely unless it is treated as a search.” 
(citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)); id. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reiterating 
these concerns, and stating that “motorists [would] have [no] constitutional grounds for complaint 
should police with dogs, stationed at long traffic lights, circle cars waiting for the red signal to turn 
green”). 
 242. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
 243. See id. at 707. 
 244. Id. (“A ‘canine sniff’ by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not require 
opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden 
from public view, as does, for example, an officer’s rummaging through the contents of the luggage. 
Thus, the manner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less 
intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcot-
ics, a contraband item. . . . We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in 
the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by 
the procedure. Therefore, we conclude that the particular course of investigation that the agents 
intended to pursue here—exposure of respondent’s luggage, which was located in a public place, to 
a trained canine—did not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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er the object sniffed contains contraband; and (3) that dogs are highly 
accurate.245 All three assertions are myth,246 but myth that has served as 
the underlying basis of thousands of court decisions since 1983.247 Jus-
tice O’Connor offered no empirical data to support these three critical 
assertions. Justice Stevens, for the Caballes majority, mimicked the 
Place conclusions and wrote: 
Accordingly, the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog—one 
that “does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would 
remain hidden from public view”—during a lawful traffic stop, 
generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. In this 
case, the dog sniff was performed on the exterior of respondent’s 
car while he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Any intru-
sion on respondent’s privacy expectations does not rise to the level 
of a constitutionally cognizable infringement.248 
Justice Souter dissented in Caballes and challenged the unsupported 
framework on which the Place and Caballes decisions are based, saying 
that the accuracy of the drug dog is a myth, and argued that it should be 
treated as any other search.249 But the only issue the Caballes majority 
                                                        
 245. Id. 
 246. Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending the Protection of 
the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 NEB. L. REV. 735 (2007) (describing numerous 
instances where these three assertions are false); id. at 752–53 (“The dog’s habit of sniffing often 
causes its nose to come into contact with its target, a disturbing result when the subject is a person. 
Moreover, there is a danger that the drug dog may bite the subject of the drug sniff.”); id. at 754 
(“[T]he legitimacy of the Court’s approach depends upon whether in fact the dog is able to distin-
guish between contraband and noncontraband. The Court in Place offered no support for its conclu-
sion that the dog could be so discerning, and it is not at all clear that such support exists.”); id. at 757 
(“Existing case law demonstrates that the false-alert rate among certified drug dogs varies greatly. 
Further, the assertion in Place that drug dogs are highly accurate was not supported by any authority 
or empirical studies . . . .”); id. at 760–62 (“Thus the individual dog’s track record and an examina-
tion of its certification are essential to determine the credibility of the dog’s alert when deciding 
whether the dog’s signal should constitute probable cause. However, courts generally are disinterest-
ed in discovering the individual dog’s error rate. . . . Often, courts are willing to accept assertions of 
the dog’s training and certification as prima facie evidence of a dog’s accuracy. . . . Handler error 
affects the accuracy of a dog. . . . Dogs are animals, replete with animal tendencies and instincts 
which the handler seeks to understand and control. Even the best training cannot entirely control 
these instincts.”). 
 247. For example, as of early 2013, United States v. Place had been cited in 2,574 case deci-
sions; but only 111 of those case decisions treated it negatively. 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (citing refer-
ences as of Feb. 10, 2013). 
 248. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (citation omitted). 
 249. Id. at 417 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The Court today does not go so far as to say explicitly 
that sniff searches by dogs trained to sense contraband always get a free pass under the Fourth 
Amendment, since it reserves judgment on the constitutional significance of sniffs assumed to be 
more intrusive than a dog’s walk around a stopped car . . . . For this reason, I do not take the Court’s 
reliance on Jacobsen as actually signaling recognition of a broad authority to conduct suspicionless 
sniffs for drugs in any parked car, about which Justice Ginsburg is rightly concerned . . . or on the 
person of any pedestrian minding his own business on a sidewalk. But the Court’s stated reasoning 
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considered still open was the duration of the stop in order to bring the 
canine unit to the scene.250 If the detention of the motorist lasts longer 
than it ordinarily takes to process a traffic ticket, the extended time it 
takes to await the arrival of the dog and walk the dog around the car must 
be supported by reasonable suspicion.251 While the length of time police 
detain a motorist during a traffic stop marginally controls the expanded 
inquiry that a motorist faces, it is hardly the only important issue left to 
be considered. 
The inescapable question is why a citizen in a free society who 
commits a minor driving offense should be subject to a drug dog’s scru-
tiny without having given the police cause to believe that there might be 
                                                                                                                            
provides no apparent stopping point short of such excesses. For the sake of providing a workable 
framework to analyze cases on facts like these, which are certain to come along, I would treat the 
dog sniff as the familiar search it is in fact, subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment.” (citing 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)). 
 250. Id.; see also id. at 411–14 (“The infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction. 
Although the Supreme Court of Illinois did not get into the sniffing averages of drug dogs, their 
supposed infallibility is belied by judicial opinions describing well-trained animals sniffing and 
alerting with less than perfect accuracy, whether owing to errors by their handlers, the limitations of 
the dogs themselves, or even the pervasive contamination of currency by cocaine. . . . Indeed, a 
study cited by Illinois in this case for the proposition that dog sniffs are ‘generally reliable’ shows 
that dogs in artificial testing situations return false positives anywhere from 12.5% to 60% of the 
time, depending on the length of the search. . . . Once the dog’s fallibility is recognized, however, 
that ends the justification claimed in Place for treating the sniff as sui generis under the Fourth 
Amendment: the sniff alert does not necessarily signal hidden contraband, and opening the container 
or enclosed space whose emanations the dog has sensed will not necessarily reveal contraband or 
any other evidence of crime.”); id. at 423–25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The dog sniff in this case, it 
bears emphasis, was for drug detection only. A dog sniff for explosives, involving security interests 
not presented here, would be an entirely different matter. Detector dogs are ordinarily trained not as 
all-purpose sniffers, but for discrete purposes. For example, they may be trained for narcotics detec-
tion or for explosives detection or for agricultural products detection. . . . This Court has distin-
guished between the general interest in crime control and more immediate threats to public safe-
ty. . . . Even if the Court were to change course and characterize a dog sniff as an independent Fourth 
Amendment search . . . the immediate, present danger of explosives would likely justify a bomb sniff 
under the special needs doctrine.” (citations omitted)). 
 251. Id. at 407–08 (“A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket 
to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete 
that mission. In an earlier case involving a dog sniff that occurred during an unreasonably prolonged 
traffic stop, the Illinois Supreme Court held that use of the dog and the subsequent discovery of 
contraband were the product of an unconstitutional seizure. We may assume that a similar result 
would be warranted in this case if the dog sniff had been conducted while respondent was being 
unlawfully detained.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 
2008) (upholding district court’s finding that police possessed sufficient constitutional justification 
to authorize Branch’s 30-minute detention and subsequent denial of Branch’s motion to suppress); 
United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 132–33 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding officer’s questioning unrelat-
ed to the traffic stop only caused a brief delay to the otherwise efficient, eleven-minute traffic stop); 
United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1721 (2010) (deter-
mining that once traffic stop was converted to investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion that 
motorists were engaged in drug trafficking, state trooper did not illegally extend duration of stop by 
requiring motorist to drive to police department for canine drug sniff). 
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drugs in the car. The Supreme Court’s conclusion that no search takes 
place in this situation, an unsupported conclusion, hardly provides a rea-
soned explanation for allowing the additional intrusion into a detained 
motorist’s privacy. Perhaps the real inquiry should be whether subjecting 
a motorist who has committed a minor traffic violation to a drug dog in-
quiry without cause is consistent with the expectations of a free peo-
ple.252 Once the Supreme Court decided that a dog sniff is not a search, 
the Court concluded that it had completed the job and need not subject 
the police activity to the Fourth Amendment’s standard of reasonable-
ness. However, the Court has never completed that task. Obviously, 
states and municipalities cannot subject every motorist stopped for a traf-
fic violation to a drug dog sniff. They lack both the manpower and 
trained dog power.253 Moreover, if police subjected every stopped car to 
such scrutiny, it would unreasonably extend the duration of a traffic stop 
while the officer on the scene awaited the arrival of the canine unit, run-
ning afoul of the remaining Fourth Amendment standard applicable to 
traffic stops. 
3. Consensual Searches Following a Traffic Stop 
A consensual search of an automobile stopped for a minor traffic 
offense is the gold standard from the perspective of law enforcement. 
Police may not search an automobile stopped for a traffic offense without 
the motorist’s consent, unless probable cause develops during the stop to 
arrest the driver or to search the vehicle.254 As discussed earlier, in the 
past sixteen years, many states have instituted procedures to track police 
activities in traffic stops to identify race biases.255 Raw data from states 
that collect this information demonstrates a marked difference in num-
bers between searches of white and black drivers.256 However, with the 
exception of New Jersey, this data does not help a criminal defendant 
build a defense.257 The data is generally used only as an internal check 
                                                        
 252. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Since it is the task 
of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite 
the expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society.”). 
 253. Cf. Explosive- and Drug-Sniffing Dogs’ Performance is Affected by Their Handlers’ Be-
liefs, U.C. DAVIS HEALTH SYS. (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/ 
2011/01/110131153526.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (“[A] study . . . found that detection-
dog/handler teams erroneously ‘alerted,’ or identified a scent, when there was no scent present more 
than 200 times—particularly when the handler believed that there was scent present.”). 
 254. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). But see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
1032 (1983) (allowing “frisk” of interior to search for weapons in nonarrest situations). 
 255. See DUNN & REED, supra note 64. 
 256. But see id. (describing data from Texas and North Carolina that shows minorities are not 
pulled over disproportionately). 
 257. See supra notes 69–79 and accompanying text. 
1464 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1413 
for police departments and as a way to build transparency between police 
departments and citizens.258 In 2001, Congress considered four bills259 to 
require all states to track this data at the urging of President Clinton.260 
But those initiatives failed, presumably because by then, the Supreme 
Court had foreclosed the issue in Whren261 and Robinette.262 
Often the very traffic stop forms a part of an aggressive effort to 
stop as many traffic offenders as possible to inquire about drunk driving 
or drug trafficking.263 The request to search the vehicle goes hand-in-
hand with the additional inquiries. The federal project on drug interdic-
tion encourages local law enforcement officials to seek permission to 
search.264 Some police officers routinely request a motorist’s permission 
to search the car during a traffic stop, and some traffic stops are motivat-
ed by the desire to search the car. The deputy sheriff in Robinette,265 who 
was on drug-interdiction patrol at the time of the stop, testified in an ear-
lier case that he successfully requested motorists to consent to a search of 
their cars in 786 stops in one year alone and boasted that he searched 
every car he stopped.266 The very purpose of the stop is to investigate 
beyond the traffic offense and to try to get the motorist to consent to a 
search of the vehicle. 
                                                        
 258. Memorandum on Fairness in Law Enforcement from Bill Clinton, President of U.S., to the 
Sec’y of the Treasury, Att’y Gen., and Sec’y of Interior (June 9, 1999), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1999-06-14/html/WCPD-1999-06-14-Pg1067.htm (“We must 
work together to build the trust of all Americans in law enforcement. . . . The systematic collection 
of statistics and information regarding Federal law enforcement activities can increase the fairness of 
our law enforcement practices.”). 
 259. End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, S. 989, 107th Cong. (2001); End Racial Profiling Act of 
2001, H.R. 2074, 107th Cong. (2001); Racial Profiling Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 965, 107th 
Cong. (2001); Racial Profiling Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 1907, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 260. See Memorandum, supra note 258. 
 261. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 262. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 
 263. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 441 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Often 
displaying badges, weapons or other indicia of authority, the officers identify themselves and an-
nounce their purpose to intercept drug traffickers. They proceed to approach individual passengers, 
requesting them to show identification, produce their tickets, and explain the purpose of their travels. 
Never do the officers advise the passengers that they are free not to speak with the officers. An ‘in-
terview’ of this type ordinarily culminates in a request for consent to search the passenger’s lug-
gage.”). 
 264. See LYMAN, supra note 60 (discussing protocol for Operation Pipeline: “law enforcement 
officers . . . ask key questions to help determine whether or not motorists they had stopped for traffic 
violations were also carrying drugs”). 
 265. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33. 
 266. State v. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498, 591–92 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (“Deputy Newsome 
further testified that, in 1992 alone, he asked for consent to search a vehicle incident to a traffic stop 
‘approximately 786 times give or take a few.’”). 
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The standard for consent sets a very low bar, as established by the 
Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.267 First, the Court said that 
whether consent is voluntary or the product of duress is to be determined 
from the totality of the circumstances.268 Knowledge of the right to refuse 
is one factor to be considered, but it is not controlling,269 and this factor 
has largely disappeared in lower courts’ analyses of whether consent is 
voluntary. Consequently, police need not advise an individual of the right 
to refuse. A court reviewing the legality of a “consensual” search must 
determine whether the consent to search was an act of free will voluntari-
ly given, and not the result of duress or coercion. Justice Brennan, in his 
dissenting opinion, raised the obvious objection, but to no avail: “It 
wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to have 
waived something as precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever 
being aware of its existence.”270 
Some state and federal courts, concerned that simple traffic stops 
were being routinely transformed into drug searches, held that the Fourth 
Amendment restricted police from requesting permission to search with-
out reasonable suspicion to warrant further investigation, or without in-
forming the motorist that he was free to leave, thereby ensuring that the 
motorist’s submission to interrogation or a search was purely consensu-
al.271 The Supreme Court in Ohio v. Robinette272 expressly rejected 
Ohio’s bright-line rule that a police officer must inform a motorist that he 
is free to go before expanding the inquiry by asking about other crimes 
or seeking consent to search the car. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for 
the majority, said that the Court has “consistently eschewed bright-line 
rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness 
inquiry,” sticking with the totality of the circumstances test adopted in 
Schneckloth and pointing out again that, as in Whren, the officer’s true 
motivation for the stop remains irrelevant.273 The Court makes a disin-
genuous claim that it rejects bright-line rules; in reality, the Supreme 
Court rejects such rules only when the rules would protect a person’s 
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 268. Id. at 227. 
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 270. Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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 272. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 
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Fourth Amendment rights, not when it expands police authority.274 
Again, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority, pointing out that the 
officer’s failure to tell Robinette that he was free to leave meant that a 
reasonable person in the same circumstances would continue to believe 
that he was not free to leave.275 This belief impacts the motorist’s free-
dom to refuse the search. The Court’s body of law concerning consensual 
searches, like consensual stops,276 predicates itself on the Court’s belief 
that motorists know when they have the right to refuse a police officer’s 
request. It is a belief based upon a misperception that Americans know 
their rights in these contexts and feel comfortable exercising them. 
States may impose stricter limitations on police under their own 
state constitutions.277 Ohio, which has not traditionally interpreted the 
state constitution more strictly than the Fourth Amendment,278 held that 
the search of the car in Robinette was illegal because Deputy Newsome 
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had already issued a warning for the traffic infraction, so the continuing 
detention was illegal under the Fourth Amendment; therefore, the mari-
juana found during the search was the fruit of an illegal detention.279 The 
State did not appeal again to the U.S. Supreme Court, but that Court 
might have disagreed with the Ohio Supreme Court’s strict definition of 
when the legal traffic stop ended and the illegal detention began.280 The 
resulting practice in Ohio was predictable: if consent to search the car 
comes before issuing the traffic ticket or warning, a voluntary consent is 
not the product of an illegal detention.281 
Justice Stevens got it right. Motorists consent to searches without 
the knowledge that they have the constitutional right to say no. Equally 
troubling is that motorists are held to have consented even when they did 
not know they were consenting because the officers’ requests are verbal-
ized as a statement rather than a question. It boggles the mind that Depu-
ty Newsome secured consent from all 786 motorists that he stopped in 
one year while enforcing traffic laws for purposes of drug interdiction. A 
random selection of 786 people would surely result in at least a few who 
would say no, unless, as is likely, the deputy did not present the request 
as a choice. In that earlier case, the court of appeals characterized Deputy 
Newsome’s questions about drugs and requests to search as “clearly not 
the stuff of casual conversation but . . . in the manner of an investiga-
tion.”282 Law student responses to these situations, even after having read 
the cases and knowing that they do not have to consent, have changed 
over the years. Students claim, even within the safety of a classroom, that 
they would agree to a police officer’s request to search the car because 
they are more concerned about the ramifications of a refusal than they 
are about an officer rummaging in their belongings. If that is the case in a 
pristine classroom, imagine how it must seem to a motorist, who does not 
know his rights, alone with a police officer on a highway. 
The Supreme Court’s readiness to find valid consent in stressful 
situations makes me want to put the word consensual in quote marks. 
United States v. Drayton involved police “working the buses” along the 
I-95 “drug corridor.”283 Three police officers boarded the bus just before 
its departure from a rest stop. One officer moved to the back of the bus, 
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the second stayed in front of the bus by the exit, and the third worked his 
way from the back of the bus to the front, asking passengers for their 
permission to search them and their luggage.284 The officers did not tell 
passengers that they could refuse permission,285 which officers had done 
in the first case before the Supreme Court, and which the Court had 
found so important in its determination that the search in that case was 
consensual.286 The practice is designed clearly to pressure the passengers 
to allow police to search. When the officer reached Drayton and his 
companion, he asked if they had any luggage; both men pointed to the 
overhead rack.287 The officer asked if he could check, but the search re-
vealed no contraband. Then the officer asked Drayton’s companion if he 
could search him, and the companion agreed. The pat-down search re-
vealed hard objects similar to “drug packages” in both thighs.288 Police 
arrested Drayton’s companion and hauled him off the bus. Then the of-
ficer asked Dayton if he could search him, and Dayton agreed. The 
search revealed similar packages.289 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the po-
lice obtained consent as a product of duress because persons in that situa-
tion do not feel free to disregard an officer’s request to search unless they 
are given some positive indication that consent may be refused.290 The 
Supreme Court disagreed: 
When Officer Lang approached respondents he did not brandish a 
weapon or make any intimidating movements. He left the aisle free 
so that respondents could exit. He spoke to passengers one by one 
and in a polite, quiet voice. Nothing he said would suggest to a rea-
sonable person that he or she was barred from leaving the bus or 
otherwise terminating the encounter.291 
Justice Kennedy conveniently ignored the officer at the front of the 
bus—whom a passenger would likely have seen—as an obstacle to leav-
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ing.292 As to the defendant’s claim that no reasonable person would feel 
free to refuse to cooperate after his companion had been arrested, Justice 
Kennedy demurred: 
And when Lang requested to search Brown and Drayton’s persons, 
he asked first if they objected, thus indicating to a reasonable person 
that he or she was free to refuse. Even after arresting Brown, Lang 
provided Drayton with no indication that he was required to consent 
to a search. To the contrary, Lang asked for Drayton’s permission to 
search him (“Mind if I check you?”), and Drayton agreed.293 
It has become increasingly difficult to take the Supreme Court’s de-
cisions on consensual searches and consensual encounters seriously. It is 
hard to determine whether the Court is so insulated that the Justices are 
naive or if they are disingenuously imposing constitutional doctrine 
based on assertions that they know do not exist on the streets or in the 
buses (police officers do not work the aisles of planes). I fully realize that 
neither is a flattering portrait of the Supreme Court. The Justices write as 
though they do not know who are the targets of these traffic stops. The 
worse alternative, which is more likely, is that they do not care, and they 
are imposing Fourth Amendment doctrine, which is totally skewed in 
favor of law enforcement, against the rights of individual citizens.294 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Just half a century ago, the Supreme Court attempted to counter po-
lice abuse and criminal justice injustice in the states by applying the Bill 
of Rights and its protections through the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment and its exclusionary rule 
formed a key aspect of the due process revolution.295 The Warren Court’s 
criminal justice cases made up just one element of that Court’s attempt to 
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address America’s endemic racial injustice.296 Each of these cases, while 
protecting all Americans, specifically addressed aspects of American life 
that perpetuated racial injustice. 
The end of the Warren Court, marked by Chief Justice Earl War-
ren’s retirement in 1969, also signaled the end of the Supreme Court’s 
dedication to protecting Americans from police misconduct through the 
enforcement and enhancement of Fourth Amendment rights.297 No area 
better illustrates the Court’s abandoned commitment to these rights than 
police–motorist interactions. With two notable exceptions,298 the Su-
preme Court has validated almost every police stop and search of a car 
since 1970. It is a shameful track record. In the earliest years of the re-
trenchment, the Court virtually eliminated the warrant requirement for 
searches of automobiles.299 But at least those earlier cases retained prob-
able cause for search under the automobile exception or a lawful arrest 
for a search incident to arrest. 
The Supreme Court’s greatest impact on drivers on America’s 
streets and highways has been to make them fair game for the application 
of unrestrained police discretion. Over the past fifteen years, the Court 
virtually eliminated Fourth Amendment restraints on police when stop-
ping and ticketing motorists. Under the fictional guise of an objective 
reasonableness standard, the Court’s road cases have failed to restrain 
police power to stop and investigate almost any motorist on the street or 
highway who commits any trivial traffic violation, maximizing police 
discretion of who to stop and which motorists to subject to investigation 
for other crimes. Moreover, the Court has said that state laws that author-
ize a police officer to arrest a motorist for any trivial offense do not vio-
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late the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable seizures, and 
the Court refuses to enforce state laws that prohibit arrests for minor of-
fenses so long as there is probable cause to justify the arrest. Police may 
subject every legally stopped car to a drug dog investigation. 
The burden of the Court’s road case decisions falls most heavily on 
black and other minority drivers, who are most likely to be selected for 
these stops and who are most likely to be questioned about drug posses-
sion, trafficking, and other crimes. The Court turned a blind eye to the 
actual motivations for these stops and expanded investigations; the 
Court’s claim to being colorblind validates traffic stops based on race 
and encourages the continuation of the practice. Even worse is the 
Court’s doctrine on consensual searches, providing that reasonable per-
sons feel free to deny such requests. In so doing, the Court denies the 
reality that most people are too afraid to say no to a police request or be-
lieve that to say no would be fruitless or would subject them to worse 
consequences. 
The only Fourth Amendment protection for motorists today comes 
from state high courts, some of which have imposed greater restrictions 
on their police than the Supreme Court does through the Fourth Amend-
ment. However, state courts imposing higher standards must do so under 
their state constitutions. The Supreme Court is hopeless at the present 
time, and it has transformed the Fourth Amendment criminal procedure 
course—as many of my colleagues like to say—into a history course. 
Motorists should drive right by the Supreme Court because, for the fore-
seeable future, the Court is committed to not restraining arbitrary police 
discretion on our streets and highways. The only way to reverse this dis-
mal record is for the Supreme Court to limit police from stopping for 
trivial traffic offenses unrelated to highway safety, to forbid police to 
arrest for traffic offenses without a separate justification, to forbid police 
to inquire about other offenses during a traffic stop without reasonable 
suspicion, and to require police to demonstrate a justifiable reason to re-
quest to search a traffic offender’s vehicle. Absent meaningful change, 
the Fourth Amendment imposes too little restraint upon police on the 
streets and highways of America. 
 
